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ABSTRACT
Throughout its long history, Iran has always sought to be a world
power. Regardless of its regime and ideology, it has pursued an ambitious
policy despite its actual weakness. In order to accomplish its perpetual goal,
Iran has searched the necessary political and military means. Since late 1950s,
Iranian leadership has believed that nuclear weapons have been the best
appropriate means for this purpose. Thus, Tehran worked on every way to
obtain nuclear technology, sometimes clandestinely, that will provide it with
the option of developing and deploying a nuclear weapons capability which will
give the ability to project power to its periphery. By the time, Iran acquired a
considerable experience regarding to nuclear technology particularly with the
help of Russia and China, even though it couldn't succeed to build its planned
nuclear power plants yet. Notwithstanding its membership to the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, with its ongoing determined efforts, Iran seems to have
nuclear weapons in the near future. Besides attempts to acquire nuclear
infrastructure and scientific knowledge Iran has also embarked on a ballistic
missile development program. Having the assistance of Russia, China, and
North Korea, Iran obtained its indigenous ballistic missile production
capability. Should Iran become a nuclear weapon power with its  IRBMs or
ICBMs as delivery means, it will alter the balance of power in the region and
affect negatively the Gulf, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the
Mediterranean, Asia the Minor, and extra regional states such as the US and
Britain.
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ÖZET
İran tarih boyunca hep bir dünya gücü olma yollarını aramıştır.
Devletin yönetim biçimi ve ideolojisine bağlı kalmaksızın, gerçek zayıflığına
rağmen yüksek emelleri olan bir politika izlemiştir. Bu daimi hedefini
gerçekleştirmek için İran, gerekli siyasi ve askeri araçları araştırmaktadır.
1950'lerin sonlarından beri, İranlı liderler nükleer silahların bu maksat için en
uygun araç olduklarına inanmışlardır. Bu nedenle Tahran kendisine, nükleer
silahları geliştirme ve konuşlandırma seçeneği sağlayacak olan nükleer
teknolojiyi elde etmek için, bazen gizlicede olsa, her yola başvurmuştur. Bu
nükleer seçenek İran'a bölgesinde güç yansıtma kabiliyeti kazandıracaktır.
Zamanla İran, henüz planladığı nükleer santralleri kuramamasına rağmen, bu
teknoloji alanında başlangıçta ABD daha sonra da Rusya ve Çin'in
yardımlarıyla önemli tecrübeler elde etmiştir. Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasının
Önlenmesi Anlaşmasına taraf olmasına rağmen, devam eden kararlı çabaları
sebebiyle İran yakın gelecekte nükleer silahlara sahip olacak gözüküyor.
Nükleer altyapı ve bilgi kazanma çalışmalarına ilave olarak İran balistik füze
geliştirme programı da başlatmıştır. Rusya, Çin ve Kuzey Kore'nin yardımlarını
elde etmesiyle İran kendi balistik füzelerini üretebilme kabiliyeti kazanmıştır.
Eğer İran kendi ürettiği  Orta Menzilli ve Kıtalararası Balistik Füzelerle birlikte
nükleer silah gücüne sahip olursa, bölgedeki güç dengelerini değiştirecektir ve
Körfez'i, Orta Doğuyu, Kafkasları, Orta Asya'yı, Akdeniz ülkelerini, Küçük
Asya ile ABD, İngiltere gibi bölge dışı devletleri olumsuz etkileyecektir.
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1INTRODUCTION
Iran’s geopolitical environment and strategic thinking have
fundamentally changed since the early 1980s. Since that time, the Islamic
revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the defeat of
Iraq in the Second Gulf War of 1991 by the United States-led coalition,
subsequent isolation of Baghdad, and the larger United States (US) military
presence have altered Iran’s basic strategic outlook. These developments
have led Iran to take a series of actions aimed at strengthening its strategic
power and advancing its interests, and these in turn have contributed to an
enhancement of the threat projected toward other states.
The political actions and foreign policies of Islamic Republic of
Iran are a major concern for stability and security in the Middle East. Today,
Iran is generally viewed by the international community as a major threat to
the stability of the Middle East or Gulf region in particular, the Caucasus,
and the Central Asia. Some analysts argue that Iran is a potentially severe
threat, perhaps an existential one, to a variety of states and regimes. Others
believe that Iranian threat is highly exaggerated, and constraints imposed on
Iran considerably limit its implications.
One difficulty in this debate is understanding the sources of Iranian
behavior. Some aspects of Iran's behavior stemmed from its perceptions of
the threats posed to its own security, particularly by Iraq, Israel and the US,
2and from its needs to counter those threats, deter its opponents and defend
its interests. On the other hand, there is also no doubt that Iranian activities
generated a sense of threat and some of its activities deviated from a
deterrent defensive pose.
Some factors have played a major role in shaping Iranian image in
the world and have kept Iran at the center of the international attention:
Iran's nationalist demand to expand Persian influence and ideological
request to export its Islamic revolution, Iranian opposition to the Arab-
Israeli peace process, its encouraged Shi'ite activists in its neighbors, its
alleged sponsorship of terrorism around the world, its continued occupation
of the United Arab Emirates  (UAE) islands, its attempt to dominate the
Gulf region as the sole hegemonic power, its active role in attempting to
destabilize Gulf states, and its ongoing programs to develop conventional
military arsenal and to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
especially nuclear weapons, with long-range ballistic missiles.
Particularly, its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons created major
concerns about Iran since nuclear weapons are the one class of power that
would truly change the balance of power. The possibility that Iran will
eventually become a nuclear power is one of the top issues facing the
international environment. International community's suspicion is that Iran
is pursuing a nuclear weapons development program accelerated since the
end of the war in the Gulf in 1991. This war revealed Iraq's significant
progress toward the production of nuclear weapons. Saddam Hussein defied
3the United Nations for nearly ten years until 1990. He also managed to
evade from the eyes of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)1, and was about to retain
nuclear weapons development capability. Baghdad's considerable progress
caused long-standing concerns that Iran also is building a bomb
clandestinely, despite its legal standing as a non-nuclear weapon state under
the terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Iran's known nuclear technology infrastructure is at present rather
rudimentary, although it is building an extensive civilian nuclear
infrastructure that could serve as a stepping-stone to a weapons program. In
particular, its efforts to acquire nuclear research reactors, power plants, and
fuel cycle-related facilities, its apparent investigation of various uranium
enrichment techniques, and reports of Iranian efforts to obtain fissile
material in the former Soviet Union have raised questions about Iran's
intentions.
It is widely believed in most circles that the Islamic Republic of
                                                
1 UNSCOM: By its resolution 687 of 3 April 1991, the United Nations Security Council
established the terms and conditions for the formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition of
Member States co-operating with Kuwait. Section C of this resolution called for the elimination,
under international supervision, of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a
range greater than 150 kilometres (km), together with related items and production facilities. It
also called for measures to ensure that the acquisition and production of prohibited items were not
resumed. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was set up to implement the non-
nuclear provisions of the resolution and to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in the nuclear areas. The precise terms are laid out in paragraphs 7 to 13 of the resolution. See
http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/General/basicfacts.html.
4Iran is supporting a number of programs overtly or covertly which will
provide it with the option of developing and deploying a nuclear weapons
capability in the near future. The operating civilian research and power
reactors that are under construction or planned; Iranian efforts to
clandestinely develop an uranium enrichment program and possibly a
facility for plutonium separation; attempts by Iranian agents to illegally
purchase fissile material and "dual use" items that can be used for nuclear
weapons development from foreign sources; and Iran’s ballistic missile
program as  delivery means are all components of concern about Iran's
nuclear programs. The debate about Iran’s nuclear weapons also relates to
Iran’s political and military intentions as well as financial cost, strategic
benefits and liabilities of a nuclear program.
This three-chapter thesis seeks to define Iran's nuclear and missile
programs from a broad perspective. The First Chapter analyzes Iran's
geopolitics. It reveals that throughout its long history, Iran always tried to
become a leader country in its region and around the world. To a great
extent, its struggle is to establish a "world empire". This perpetual aim has
apparently never been changed with time and regime. Time to time, its
leadership followed a peaceful foreign policy. However, its basic state
ideology has remained same.
The Second Chapter examines the Iranian nuclear and missile
acquisition efforts to achieve its ambitions and ideology. Tehran believes
that the country's current capabilities are not sufficient to realize its
5historical and ideological goals. In order to be a hegemonic power in the
world, Iran needs a political and military strength, which can only be
nuclear weapons. With nuclear capability Iran would deal with the threats
posed by its adversaries. This chapter begins with the Iranian threat
perceptions, which Iran considered to counter with nuclear weapons, then,
discusses why Iran wants nuclear weapons, which factors motivate it.
The nuclear intentions of Iran are not so clear since there are not
many official statements and public evidences that Iran wants nuclear
weapons. But there are sufficient available data on Iran's activities that give
signs about Iran's nuclear weapons development program.  In this chapter,
after analyzing Tehran's intentions, international arms control commitments
of Iran is also examined. Despite its membership of all major arms control
agreements, Iran is believed to have searched for nuclear weapons option.
The ways Iran followed to acquire nuclear weapons and the problems it
encountered are also given in this chapter. As a complementary of its
nuclear weapons development program, Iran's ballistic missile development
program is also discussed in Chapter Two.
Lastly, Chapter Three examines the impact of Iranian nuclear
weapons on Iran and its region as well as nonproliferation regimes. The
chapter argues primarily the impact on Iran's domestic politics and foreign
policy. The balance of power will change in the Middle East should Iran
develops nuclear weapons. They will affect mostly the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states.  The whole Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia,
6and even Europe will also be influenced by Iranian nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles. In addition, Turkey, Israel, the US, and Britain will be
touched too much due to their interests and relations in the region. Iranian
nuclear missiles will also have dire consequences for nonproliferation
regimes, especially for NPT.
In Conclusion, Iran's nuclear weapons development program is
assessed and some policy options are proposed regarding Iran, the region,
and other international actors.
The study has a descriptive method in that it tries to demonstrate
Iran's nuclear development program. It presents a scene that Iran struggled
for nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
At the beginning, I made a literature survey. There were plenty of
written material about the subject. Then I examined many books found in
the libraries of Bilkent and Middle East Technical Universities. I searched
almost all related articles from scholarly journals. I observed that while
some authors have seemingly solid evidences, some had baseless arguments,
approached the subject rather ideologically to form an anti-Iranian Diaspora
and directly charged Iran without any concrete findings. So, I tried to be
selective. I crosschecked almost every information that I found from other
articles or books. I benefited from the ideas of many authors not only from
Western countries and Israel but also from Iran. Besides, some Turkish
experts were very helpful for the study. I also looked into some documents,
various web sites, magazines and news agencies.
7CHAPTER 1:  GEOPOLITICS OF IRAN
THROUGHOUT HISTORY
1.1.  Geographic Importance of Iran
Iran lies between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf and is
strategically positioned with Iraq and Turkey on its western border,
Afghanistan and Pakistan on its eastern border, and Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and Turkmenistan as Newly Independent States on its northern border.
Iran's geographic location made it the bridge for interaction by land
between Far Eastern Asia and the lands of the Mediterranean and Europe.
This central position has put Iran in the center of international trade and
commerce. It was on the well-known Silk Road, which connected Europe
with China. When sea routes became important, additional highways led up
from ports along the Persian Gulf to the principal commercial centers both
within the country and beyond its frontiers. In history, the country has been
coveted for centuries by traders, conquerors, and defenders of imperial
interests to the south and to the north of the Iran. Today it is also an
important bridge connecting the newly emerged states of Central Asia to the
West, especially for the shipment of Central Asian oil.2
                                                
2 John W. Limbert, "Iran: At War With History", (Boulder: Westview Press,
1987), pp. 3-4; Grant M. Farr, "Modern Iran", (New York: McGraw-Hill College, 1989),
pp. 2-3; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "The Foreign Policy of Iran: 1500-1941-A Developing
Nation in World Affairs", (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966), pp.301-302.
81.2.  Historical Perspective
Iran's central location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia has had
an important impact on shaping its history, culture, society and politics.
Within historic times its rulers expanded their authority far to the east and
the west of the Iranian plateau and established the first great world empire.3
As a world empire, the first Iranian local dynasty was the
Achamenians that gave Iran its first period of glory by the 6th cent. B.C.4
The Achamenians created the largest empire in the world at that time and
they attained universal greatness under the brilliant leadership of Cyrus the
Great and Darius the Great. By 546 B.C. Cyrus the Great was the founder of
the Achaemenian empire. His achievements were impressive and began to
aspire to nothing less than the conquest of the entire known world,
beginning in the west. His "known world" included Egypt, Carthage,
Ethiopia, and Greek colonies in the west, and China in the east. He had
conquered Lydia, and much of western Asia Minor. He had extended the
northeastern frontier of the empire to the Syr Derya River and into present-
day Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan. Cyrus died in a battle in 451
B.C. He was the world's first great emperor and wished to expand his
empire as possible as he could.
After Cyrus, Darius turned out to be second only to Cyrus as "Great
King, King of the Kings" (451 B.C.-486 B.C.) and even more than Cyrus,
                                                
3 Donald N. Wilber, "Iran: Past and Present", (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1975), pp. 3-4.
9the architect of the Persian Empire. He ruled for 35 years and during his
reign, he fought nineteen battles at the rate of nearly a battle a month, and
defeated nine kinglets. He enlarged the empire to two million square miles
and contained ten million people. He crossed the Bosphorus; he pushed his
borders to present-day Bulgaria. Pressing eastward, he took what is today
Uzbekistan.5
The empires of Iran had died, but its memory lived on for centuries.
The Achamenian "Great Kings" vanished in Iranian history, but they left a
legacy.6 This legacy of the early centuries may be seen to demonstrate the
peculiar characteristic of Iran's political system and foreign policy. Iranian
policy makers always adopted objectives beyond their means and dreamed
Iran as world power. The objectives and means of the state were those of the
monarch. The means most often preferred was using power and war which
was motivated by expansionism and religious dogmatism.7
Continuity with the past was expressed in such a way that the
Iranian states thought of themselves as the political heirs of the
Achamenids. They tried to pursue a policy parallel to that of Achamenids in
establishing a powerful national state both in its region and in the world.8
After the Achamenians the next great Iranian dynasty was the
                                                                                                                       
4 John W. Limbert, op. cit., pp. 54-57.
5 William H. Forbis, "Fall of the Peacock Throne: The Story of Iran", (New York:
Harper&Row, Publishers, 1980), pp. 16-17.
6 John W. Limbert, op. cit., pp. 54-57.
7 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, op. cit., p. 32; In 1988, Hashemi Rafsanjani stated
related to Iran-Iraq War: "We bit off more than we could chew." See for details: IRNA
Tehran, Home Service 8 February in BBC SWB ME/0381/A/1-4, 10 February 1989.
8 Donald N. Wilber, op. cit., p.77.
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Sassanian (A.D. 226-A.D. 637). The Sassanians revived greater Iran and
restored much of the glory of the former Achamenian dynasty. They
followed the politics of expansionism and enlarged the borders of the state.9
The rulers called themselves "King of the Kings of Iranians and non-
Iranians".
The Sassanian period witnessed the continuity of an expansionist
nationalistic Iran, strong and prosperous in its own right, and unreceptive to
foreign contacts and influences. The divine right of the king was reflected in
scenes of the investiture of the monarchs by the gods. The rulers were proud
to serve and to adore the gods, although they assumed that they themselves
were gods of the people on earth.10
Since the Sassanians, Iranians perceive the Safavids (1502-1736) as
the first native Iranian dynasty and thus the heirs of ancient Achamenid
glory.11 The Safavi rulers strove to expand the frontiers of Iran to those of
ancient times.12 The rise of the Safavids marks the reemergence of a
powerful authority attained by former Iranian empires within and out of the
boundaries.13
The founder of the Safavi dynasty was Shah Ismail (1486-1524;
Reign: 1502-1526). He regarded himself as "the absolute Agent of God".
                                                
9 Grant M. Farr, op. cit., p. 17.
10 Donald N. Wilber, op. cit., p.35.
11 Laraine Newhouse Carter, "History of the People", in Richard F. Nyrops, ed.,
Iran: A Country Study, (Washington: The American University, 1978), p. 40.
12 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, op. cit., pp. 302-303.
13 Shaul Bakhash, "Historical Setting", in Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Iran: A Country
Study, (Washington: Secretary of the Army, 1989), p. 16.
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His campaign of conquest and conversion gave him vast territories in Iran.
These victories, gained by ruthless massacres, almost restored the ancient
frontiers of Sassanians. Beyond this, Shah Ismail had wished to establish a
"world empire".14
The Safavids adopted Shia Islam and the Shah Ismail declared Shia
Islam the state religion. He aspired to extend the Shi'i creed beyond the
boundaries of his empire, and tried to export Shi'ism for subversion. He
used proselytizing and force not only to convert large majority of Muslims
in Iran to the Shia sect but also to export Shi'ism to the other Muslim and
non-Muslim states.15
Safavids' skill and success lay in capturing the force of a
suppressed religious aspiration. Religion was used as a basis for authority.
Religious classes with religion their main instrument were encouraged for
gaining power of the state. Very influential in their policy shaping was the
necessity of welding together a Shi'ite Persia capable of meeting the
challenge of expanding and creating world empire.16
The last dynasty of Iran, Pahlavi Dynasty, was founded by Reza
Pahlavi (1877-1941; Reign: 1925-1941). He ruled from 1925 to 1941 and
wished to Westernize and particularly to industrialize Iran while retaining or
restoring those traditions not antithetical to modernization.17
                                                
14 Mehmet Saray, "Türk-Iran İlişkileri", (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi,
1999), p. 19-21; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
15 Shaul Bakhash, op. cit., p.16.
16 Peter Avery, "Modern Iran", (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1967), pp. 20-21.
17 Laraine Newhouse Carter, op. cit., p. 53.
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After Reza Shah, his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980;
Reign: 1941-1979) came to power. The Shah had an ambition, like his
father's, to build a modern country on the model of the West, especially the
United States. Depending on its oil resources, Iran would become a world
power under the leadership of the Shah, amassing a large modern and strong
army. Massive increases in oil revenues enabled shah to realize his goals.
He was able to accelerate efforts to achieve his goal of making Iran one of
the top five world powers by the year 2000. He had intensified the efforts to
industrialize the economy that his father had started, and he had begun the
process of modernizing and expanding the armed forces. Huge sums of
money were allocated to industry, irrigation, transportation, education and
various social services. The longest single category of expenditures by far
was devoted to modernizing and expanding the military.18 The Shah
lavished huge sums of money on military equipment, acquiring some of the
most sophisticated and expensive weaponry in the Western alliance's
arsenal.19 Consequently, Iran established the strongest military power in the
Persian Gulf region in 1970s. Relying upon his army, the Shah had
territorial ambitions to create Iran as the regional "Great Power"20 and
mentioned Iranian claim on Bahrain after British withdrawal from the Gulf.
At the same time, he landed troops on Abu Musa and two other small
                                                
18 Richard F. Nyrop, "General Character of the Society", in Richard F. Nyrop, ed.,
Iran: A Country Study, (Washington: The American University, 1978), p. 6.
19 William L. Cleveland, "A History of the Modern Middle East", (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1994), p. 277.
20 Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade",
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islands near the mouth of the Gulf. Shortly, the Shah was determined to
dominate his region21 and sought a place for Iran among the world's
strongest powers,22 as his ancestors did before.
1.3.  Revolutionary Iran
Islamic fundamentalists under the leadership of Ayatollah Sayyid
Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini took over the authority in Iran following a
revolution in 1979. The Islamic Revolution changed the internal structure in
Iran and it fundamentally altered Iran's role in the international community.
Before the revolution Iran was an important ally of the West and a firm
friend of the United States. The country would be a Western type modern
state. With the revolution this foreign policy completely shifted. Iranian
strategy has been characterized by a dual approach combining aspirations
for a global utopian Islamic empire and pragmatic regional objectives.23
Foreign policy of revolutionary Iran consisted of two basic
concepts: export of the revolution and independence from both the East and
the West or "neither west nor east" (nah gharb, nah sharq) policy.
Khomeini stated its "Islamic World Empire" project in his book
"State in Islamic Law". According to his book, the world could only be
                                                                                                                       
(Bloomington&Idianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 34.
21 Patrick Clawson, "Iran's Challenge to the West: How, When, and Why",
(Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), p. 39.
22 James D. Rudolph, "Armed Forces", in Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Iran: A Country
Study, (Washington: The American University, 1978), p. 389.
23 Yossef Bodansky, "The Grand Strategy of Iran", Global Affairs, p.20, Fall,
1993.
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saved by World Islamic Empire established by Shia. To realize this goal,
Islamic Revolution should be exported to the world.24 In other words, Iran
was requesting to transform both institutional Islam and Muslim societies as
a whole into the resurrection of a Shi'ite Islamic World Empire led from
Tehran.25  Khomeini said plainly that "Islam is a sacred trust from God to
ourselves, and the Iranian nation must grow in power and resolution until it
has vouchsafed Islam to the entire world".26 He declared on January 14,
1980: "We are at war against infidels. Jihad must triumph."27
The concept of exporting the Islamic Revolution derives from a
particular worldview that perceives Islamic Revolution as the means
whereby Muslims and non-Muslims can liberate themselves from the
oppression of tyrants who serve the interests of international imperialism.
As the experience of Iran in overthrowing the Shah demonstrated, a
renewed commitment to Islam permits oppressed nations to defeat
imperialism. According to this perspective, by following Iran's example any
country can free itself from domination of imperialist powers. Another
spectrum is the view of Iran as the vanguard of a world revolutionary
movement to liberate Muslim countries specifically, and other Third World
countries generally, from imperialism. This concept contends that the
effective export of the revolution must not be limited only to propaganda
                                                
24 Anıl Çeçen, "An Assessment of Iran-Bir İran Değerlendirmesi", Avrasya
Dosyası, p. 350, Vol.5, No. 3, Fall 1999.
25 Yossef Bodansky, op. cit., p. 19.
26 Daniel C. Diller, "Overview of the Middle East: Persian Gulf", in Daniel C.
Diller, ed., "The Middle East", (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994), p. 129.
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efforts but must also include both financial and military assistance.28 For
this reason, Iran became involved in creating and supporting resistance
organizations, particularly Shia community, in Afghanistan, Iraq and
Lebanon. Islamic government sent arms and volunteers to Afghanistan and
Iraq. It also helped train and finance guerilla movements in these three
countries.
The other concept of the revolution is "neither West nor East" or
the independence from both the West and the East. The United States, the
"Great Satan", represented the West, or capitalism, while the Soviet Union,
the "Lesser Satan", represented the East, or socialism. As a result, a major
foreign policy goal from the time of the revolution has been to preclude all
forms of political, economic, and cultural dependence on either capitalism
of the West or socialism of the East and to rely solely on Islam.29
1.4.  Post-Khomeini Period
Khomeini died in June1989. His death was a turning point in the
political history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. After Khomeini, a period of
intense reassessment of the successes and failures started. The Islamic
Republic was shaken by severe crises of political legitimacy that were
                                                                                                                       
27 Yossef Bodansky, op. cit., p. 20.
28 Eric Hooglund, "Government and Politics", in Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Iran: A
Country Study, (Washington: Secretary of the Army, 1989), pp. 221-222; Grant M. Farr,
op. cit., p. 63.
29 Mehmet Saray, op. cit., p. 158; Eric Hooglund, op. cit., p. 224; Grant M. Farr,
op. cit., p. 30; John W. Limbert, op. cit., pp. 137-139; William L. Cleveland, op. cit., p.
411; Shireen T. Hunter, op. cit., pp. 37-39.
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eroding the foundations of the system established by Khomeini. In July
1989 not radical but moderate Rafsanjani was elected as President to the
republic with an overwhelming majority of the popular vote. After the
election, he tried to strengthen the powers of the central state, implement a
program of economic reconstruction and reform, undertake an opening to
the outside world, rebuild Iran's defense policy, and started military
revitalization program.30  Rafsanjani also set some foreign policy goals
different from those of Khomeini's revolutionary republic such as the
normalization of diplomatic relations with the outside world, improvement
of access to modern Western technology, and integration of Iran into the
global capitalist system to develop its economy.
Although there were efforts to "normalize" Iran by the moderate
government, the second government could not entirely escape the
constraints imposed by its revolutionary origins and the Islamic ideology.
Actually, Iran's moderates did not differ profoundly from its radicals with
respect to foreign policy. The death of Khomeini reduced but did not end
Iran’s efforts to export the Islamic Revolution. Exporting revolution
remained a stated goal of the Iran regime.31 The Islamic ideology that fueled
the Iranian revolution was still powerful, and distrust of the outside world.32
The Iranian leadership was still revealing a "residual revolutionary
optimism", and seeing Islamic Revolution as destined to triumph. It sought
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Process Evolved", Security Dialogue, p. 110, Vol. 31, No.1, March 2000.
31 Daniel C. Diller, op. cit., pp. 130-131.
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to take advantage of a resurgence of Islam throughout the region and
accepted that Iran is opponent of the Islamic world's opponent. Accordingly,
Iran supported financially and militarily the Islamic Regime in Sudan, aided
fundamentalist Islamic groups in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey, backed
terrorist activities and bombings in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
Turkey,33 supported radical Islamists movements, like Hizbollah, Islamic
Jihad and Hamas, and opposed Arab-Israeli peace process ideologically.34
Additionally, the moderates in Iran hold ambitious aspirations to dominate
the Persian Gulf and to play a major role in the Levant, the Caucasus and
Central Asia. Therefore, they attempted to build Iran's professional military
with most sophisticated weapons as needed for a regional superpower.3536   
To sum up, civilization in Iran has revealed signs of a basic
continuity in attitudes and ideals. A distinctive Iranian civilization has
persisted from the Oxus to the Tigris-Euphrates Valley and from the
Caucasus to Northwest India, and from this two things may be understood:
first, the resilience of those who have become heirs of the Iranian legendary
glory and second, the tenacious loyalty this glory has evoked.
Throughout its long history, Iran always struggled to be a leader
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country both in its region and in the world, that is "Great Iran". This
perpetual goal never changed with the country's regime. Time to time, it
followed a peaceful foreign policy with its neighbor and non-neighbor
states. But its basic state ideology has never changed. Its applications
altered, but the main idea remained the same.
The history of Iran displays an impressive persistence and
continuity. The specific surviving elements, which produced it and the
manner in which they were expressed, are distinctive: pride in the past and
missing the glory of it, and Iranian outlook and attitude toward the world.
Modern Iran derive inspiration from the visions of their past greatness. In
modern times, visions of the ancient past have been reminded to support the
claims of modern Iranian ambitions and obviously the past has helped shape
the policy of the decision makers.
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CHAPTER 2: IRAN'S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC
       MISSILE   PROGRAMS
Many scholars argue that Iran is a potentially severe threat to a
variety of states and regimes in the Middle East, primarily in the Gulf area.
Others believe that international environment highly exaggerates Iran's
intentions and capabilities and portray Iran as a rational state in its security
policies.
The difficulty in this debate sourced from the comprehension of
Iran's activities. Some points of Iranian behavior undoubtedly stemmed
from its threats perceptions posed to its own security and from its need to
counter those threats, deter its adversaries and defend its interests. However,
it is also clear that Iranian activities generate a sense of threat. Because Iran
encourages and supports a fundamental ideological change in the status quo
in the Muslim countries. Besides many of Iranian activities deviated from a
defensive and deterrent pose. Therefore, Iran's real threat perceptions and
intentions should be examined in detail and its activities should be taken
into account.
2.1.  Iran's Threat Perceptions
Iran is a fortunate state in its strategic position. It has no existential
threats and no permanent tensions on its frontiers. It has a strong sense of
identity, culture and ancient civilization from which it takes inspiration. It
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has highly rich resources, a location at a strategic crossroads, and a
population not too small and large enough to constitute a significant market
and power. These privileges led Iranians to believe Iran as a naturally
regional power. They think that only such a power could be the leader of the
Muslim world and oppressed nations as well as protect their rights. They
want to achieve their historical and ideological ambitions as a recognized
regional power. Additionally, Iranian leadership strives to revive Islam as its
original form and retain Iran's traditionalist structure as a role model, at the
same time. Iran sees itself as an aspiring great power that is opposed to the
current, unjust, and unfriendly international hierarchy. Its foreign policy and
security issues were formed basically by these considerations. However,
Iran's security concerns were changed with the end of the bi-polar world.37
The end of the Cold War had an important impact on Iran's
international standing and its security issues. During the Cold War, the only
country capable of invading and ultimately occupying Iran was the Soviet
Union that posed a military and ideological threat. That meant Iran's most
immediate security concern was directed towards the north. After the break-
up of the Soviet Union, the situation in the north was also not optimistic for
Iran. Soviet military threat disappeared and ideological risk died away.
Although this change created new opportunities for Iran, a new danger
emerged, instability in the southern republics of the former Soviet Union.
The demise of the Soviet Union left beside politically unstable,
                                                
37 Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Strategic Predicament", Middle East Journal, Vol. 54,
21
erratic and uncertain states, namely Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and
Tajikistan, that Iran has demographically and culturally strong ties. The
existing disarray had the potential to draw Iran into a conflict. Hence, in the
north, Iran's security might be jeopardized by an internal conflict or
disintegration of any one of the newly emerged states. Besides, Iran has also
common similarities with its old unstable neighbors, Afghanistan and
Pakistan, since fifty percent of Iran's population is either non-Persian
speaking or non-Shi'i.
 The US, being the other and sole remaining superpower, has been
the "Great Satan" and a forever enemy of revolutionary Islamic Republic.
The relations between Iran and the US have been increasingly deteriorating
since Islamic revolution. Continuing US containment policy and refusal to
accept Iran as a normal, rather rogue38, state irritate Iran’s leadership. Iran’s
historical grievances nurture its perception that the United States usually
sided with the enemies of Iran, supporting for the coup against Mosaddeq,
backing of the Shah, standing behind Israel, and helping Iraq during its war
with Iran. Tehran believes that the US seeks to undermine Iran. Iran sees the
US that it uses its power in a discriminatory way and coerces small states
according to its interests. It has difficult relations with the states disagree
with it. Iran views that its containment policy is unjust and shows US
hypocrisy and unwillingness to share power with other states. Its military
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presence in the Persian Gulf is a provocation and should be reduced.
Besides, it is a threat to Islam and Islamic revolutionary Iran. Hence, Iran's
relationship with the US is almost shaped by its ideology and conflicting
interests.
The US has controlled the Persian Gulf militarily and politically.
Two wars in the Persian Gulf have increased the US military presence and
consolidated its ties with the Arab states. Since the Arab states rely upon the
US militarily, a possible conflict between Iran and one of its regional
neighbors will quickly lead to US involvement. Any US involvement is
perceived as a major threat by Iranians. The military presence of an “outside
force” in the region and hostile relations with it creates significant hurdles
for Iran such as encirclement in the north and south, military threat, and
economic and technological strangulation of the US and its allies.39 Iran has
three concerns about the US: A large-scale US intervention; a US-led allied
attack on Iran as in the Second Persian Gulf War on Iraq; and lastly a direct
attack on Iran's energy infrastructure.
Second major threat perception of Iran is Israel. All of Iranian
authorities, for both opportunistic and ideological reasons, view Israel as a
hostile country with the means, power, and resources to pose a serious
security threat to Iran. Iranians agree that the Jewish state is an active
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regional rival and as a state with imperial motivations, checking Iran’s
political and military power and undoing Iran’s achievements. Iran desires
to play an extensive role as the leader of the region but the "Zionist State"
can prevent this role through intimidation. Besides, it feels vulnerable to the
Israeli sophisticated weapons against itself and Muslim states for which it
would feel "responsible".
A more proximate and primary perceived threat for Iran is Iraq.
Iraq remains Iran's potential bitter foe and could restart a war any time when
it finds an opportunity. Iran still keeps alive grief of the eight-year war with
its neighbor. Indeed, Iraq and Iran were bound to be locked in a struggle for
regional influence and power since Iraq is planning to maintain military
preponderance over Iran, establish itself as a regional police in the Persian
Gulf, and become overlord of the Arab states.40
The defeat of Iraq during the Desert Storm didn't alter the situation.
Although Iraq is torn too much due to US-led containment policy, it is still
Iran's leading security concern. Only partial destruction of Iraq's warfare
capabilities, its restoration of military and acquisition of WMD efforts, its
irrational leader, continuation of its people's frustration and its unclear
future are still fundamentally worrisome to Iran.41
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2.2.  Iran's Motivations for Nuclear Weapons
With the end of the bi-polar world, the proliferation of nuclear
weapons has become a primary security concern for the countries that are in
conflict with their neighbors, have regional ambitions sourced from its
ideology and history, and hostile to the current international order.42 Lack of
power, namely modern conventional military strength, is a motivation for
poor states to proliferate. Without destroying their weak economy, nuclear
weapons may be the only way to realize their goals and to balance enemy
countries with modern and sophisticated conventional weapons. Because
acquiring a nuclear weapon could cost billions, but conventional military
build-up would cost tens of billions.43
The Islamic revolution and Iran-Iraq War has convinced Iran that it
is alone in the international environment. Therefore, Iran has tried to
develop its military industries so as to reduce its reliance on arms supplier
countries, diversify its arms sources to minimize the potential impact of
future embargoes, and build a large, effective military, capable of dealing
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with the range of probable threats facing Iran.
Past two wars in the region reinforced Iran's determination to
rebuild well-trained conventional military forces and nonconventional
weapon systems for an in-kind retaliatory capability to deter the adversaries,
to increase its self-reliance without depending on international treaties, and
to place little faith on international institutions in security matters.44
The Iranian leadership believes that their country is a blessed one
and a regional power by dint of its history, geography, demography and
resource endowments. Destiny dictates that Iran is the dominant power in
the Persian Gulf since it is the largest Gulf State, it has the longest coastline,
and it has vital economic interests there. The Iranians convinced that the
Islamic Republic should play a key role in world affairs as the standard
bearer of revolutionary Islam and guardian of the Muslim world and
oppressed nations. Nevertheless, the image of their country as a dominant
regional power has not been matched by corresponding military capabilities.
In order not to "bit off more than they could chew" and to bridge gap
between the Iranian goals and current facts, Iran needs strength, which can
only be the nuclear weapons.45
Iranians assume that possessing nuclear weapons would give Iran a
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voice in determining regional events and a means to retain its identity and
cultural values. To realize its historical and ideological goals and to drive
events in the Middle East, Iranians think that they will have to modernize
their armed forces as well as to build viable and deliverable nuclear
weapons.46 Having an atomic bomb is believed to enhance Iran's prestige
and regional status like Pakistan. Nuclear weapons would enable Iran to
play the role that its leadership believes is rightfully its due. These weapons
would make Iran a powerful regional military might and provide it with the
means to intimidate its neighbors and regional rivalries. Atomic bomb
would be able to undermine Gulf states' confidence in US security
guarantees in order to end "outside power" presence in the region. A nuclear
capability would enable Iran to threaten US allies such as Israel, Turkey,
Egypt, or Saudi Arabia in order to gain leverage over the US during a crisis
or confrontation.47 Iran considers that after obtaining nukes, it would be able
to block the Strait of Hormuz or to deter retaliation for attempts to disrupt
oil shipment.
Holding them would demonstrate progress and advance of its
technology. Additionally, they would assert the revolution's success,
supporting the standing of the regime in the eyes of Iranians as well as
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throughout the Arab and Muslim world.48 Also they would divert attention
from domestic inadequacies and poverty.49
Iran believes that it must be able to balance and counter threats it
can face from the US, Israel and Iraq. As an outside force in the Persian
Gulf, Tehran perceives the US as a major threat to Iran and Muslim world.
Its hopes to be a dominant regional power brings it into struggle with the
US, which is dominant militarily and politically in the region. A possible
conflict between Iran and the Middle East states will implicate US. Thus,
Iran wants to reduce Washington's political and military influence.50 In these
circumstances, even a few nuclear weapons will change US policy toward
Iran and only nuclear weapons can reduce military options of the US in the
region.51 For this reason, they can be considered as the sole guarantor of
independence and Islamic regime's survival.
Israel's nuclear capability is also a specific incentive. Iran is highly
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concerned about Israel's nuclear weapons. Iranians see Israel as a relentless
enemy and believe that its nuclear capability is a real threat to Iran’s
security. They fear that Iran’s forces will not be able to deter or defend Iran
against an Israeli attack. Furthermore, the growing Turkish-Israeli
partnership raises fears in Iran. Israel's defense cooperation with Turkey is
viewed that Israel is seeking to use Turkey's air space to reach Iran with
fighter planes for air raids as on Osiraq in 1981. Its probable direct attack or
indirect activities to arrest Iran's WMD programs convince Iran that nuclear
weapons are essential for both balancing Israeli nuclear posture and
bargaining with it and the US to defend the rights of the Islamic world.52
Finally, Iran views Iraq as the primary regional threat, even though
Baghdad was extensively wrecked during the second Gulf War. The
Iranians are unconvinced that Iraq's war capabilities, particularly NBC
capabilities, were fully terminated. Although much of Iraq's conventional
capabilities destroyed, its WMD capability, especially scientific and
engineering knowledge, remains intact. In addition, Iraq's motivations to
acquire atomic bomb did not diminish. So Iraq's nuclear program may
resume in the near future. For this reason, Iranians believe that they will
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face another challenge from their historical and regional rival in the near
future.
The eight-year war with Iraq revealed Iranian military weakness
and vulnerability.  Iran couldn't respond Iraqi chemical and missile attacks
and suffered the effects of an international arms embargo. Iran's bitter
experience may be the greatest influence on its decision to pursue
independent production capabilities of special weapons. Due to economic
weakness and other difficulties in rebuilding its conventional forces, Iran is
working to acquire WMD as deterrence against aggression. The Iran-Iraq
War demonstrated the importance of having a powerful deterrence to deal
with Iraq, which probably still holds nuclear ambitions in the mind, retains a
significant conventional edge and residual chemical and biological warfare
capabilities.53 Consequently, its war with Iraq taught a valuable lesson about
the importance of having a deterrent force against adversaries.
The other recent war, Second Persian Gulf War, in the region also
taught Iran that, for deterrence to operate, the enemy state must be
confronted with the certainty of equivalent response. In Desert Storm, the
threat of in-kind or worse retaliation is believed to have deterred Iraq for
using chemical weapons while the absence of such a retaliatory capability
facilitated Iraq's decision to use chemical weapons against Iran in the First
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Persian Gulf War. These two wars had an important effect on Iran's decision
to pursue WMD program.54
As a result, Iran's specific security motivations for nuclear weapons
are not urgent or overwhelming. It does not have an existential threat like
Israel, Pakistan, India, and China, each was motivated by vital
considerations. Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is thus motivated by
political reasons rather than any particular security threats.55 Indeed,
Nuclear weapons are not useful militarily and cannot substitute for
conventional weapons. They are useless against low-level threats, and deter
only other nuclear weapon states and possibly major use of force. Besides,
use of an atomic bomb is not so simple in warfare as Iranians think, since
they need a complicated doctrine, command and control.56
2.3.  Iran's Nuclear Intentions
Most Western experts believe that Iran has a nuclear weapons
program. They base their conclusions largely on their government's
intelligence service data and on the analysis of the long history of Iranian
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obstinate efforts to acquire nuclear weapons-related technology and dual-
use equipment, which has little other value to Iranian industry. They have
substantial amount of evidence suggesting that Iran is secretly pursuing a
broad and organized effort to develop nuclear weapons. Much of their
evidence was sourced from US and Israeli intelligence agencies. Although
some of these reports may be politically motivated, this should not be a
reason to discount the reports automatically. Besides, there are many
concrete factors that confirm international skepticism over Iran's nuclear
weapons intentions:
First, Iran has abundant oil and gas reserves and it does not need
nuclear power. It is certain that nuclear power is necessary for a country that
has no indigenous energy supply. But from a cost-benefit perspective, this
type of energy source is very expensive for Iran, 57 which its welfare level is
very low.58 Iran has made the investment eagerly, even though this has
involved sacrificing their populations' standard of living to some extent.
Certainly, the amount of capital resources devoted to the nuclear program is
unmeasurable and at the expense of societies in general.
Iran has the world's second largest natural gas reserves behind
Russia. Generating electricity from natural gas is easy and Iran can do it
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with a low domestic capital investment, while nuclear power plants require
a billion-dollar foreign investment that Iran does not have. If Iran tries to
meet all of its future electricity need using natural gas it will have minimum
92 years of reserves. Accordingly, it would be economically indiscreet for
Iran to invest in nuclear powers when compared to natural gas to meet its
current electricity as well as its future demand.59 Thus, it is difficult to
explain the Iranian stubborn efforts for obtaining nuclear power plants
unless it is part of a plan to acquire nuclear weapons.60
Second, obtaining uranium enrichment technology presents the
most effective method for Iran to fabricate an atomic bomb domestically
since it demonstrates the relative ease with which the necessary technology
can be gained. Iran's insistence on acquisition of this technology causes
severe concerns for producing nuclear weapons. Iraq, Pakistan and South
Africa also followed the same method for their weapons program. After
examining Iran's nuclear infrastructure, the list demonstrates functional
similarity to the stated countries' clandestine uranium enrichment program
and Iran has been pursuing a similar strategy.
Iraq had used three different methods for its nuclear weapons
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program, which are electromagnetic isotope separation - the calutron
method, chemical enrichment, and gaseous enrichment. Iran is following
basically the same path.61 South Africa successfully pursued this course to
build six atomic bombs.62 In Iran's case, its facilities were established for the
enrichment technology. Karaj and Isfahan have the calutron for the
production of radioisotopes; Bushehr and Mo'allem Kalayeh have the gas
centrifuges; and Tehran has chemical enrichment capability. Besides, Iran's
substantial uranium deposits in the Yazd Province make this route an
attractive option.63
Third, Iran's insistence on the completion of the Bushehr reactors
despite their ruined situations is believed to be only depended on political
momentum and clandestine nuclear weapons considerations. On the basis of
completion and operating costs, Bushehr reactors do not compare favorably
with the establishment of modern gas-fired, combined-cycle power plants.
Iran's energy policy and investment becomes irrational when examined its
current energy applications and energy potential. Only the elimination of
gas lost due to flaring and venting could produce eight times the power of
Bushehr reactors and could make a big contribution to Iran's energy needs.
Indeed, Iran does not need the electricity Bushehr will provide. It has
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already more electricity generating capacity than it needs in the near future64
and a better maintenance of existing plants would increase the electricity
generating at least 36 percent.65 On the other hand, the allocated Bushehr
reactors' investment capital in scarce supply will prevent Iran from realizing
power generation projects including many thermal projects, export
development efforts and measures to increase oil production capacity that
require hard currency. On the other hand, the result of the Bushehr project,
an atomic bomb, would be valuable enough and above everything. Nuclear
weapons are far cheaper than advanced conventional arms and have ability
of countering nuclear, biological and chemical weapon threat; hence they
can satisfy Iran's strategic goals. Iranian authorities look from this
perspective and find that investing in Bushehr is a very rational decision.66
Fourth, since Iran's industry cannot support a nuclear weapons
program, it should seek critical weapon-related materials overseas. The
collapse of the Soviet Union created disorder, which gave Iran a vast
opportunity to obtain nuclear weapon infrastructure with a low cost and a
relative ease. There were hundreds of tons of material that could be used for
nuclear weapons, covered by poor security. This vast potential of fissile
material and technical expertise provide a unique opportunity for Iran to
procure items not previously available on the open market.  The number and
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types of its contracts, deals, technical support, and potential nuclear black-
marketing of fissile material from newly independent states are all causes of
proliferation concerns. Iranian procurement patterns have pointed to a secret
weapon program. Besides, highly skilled Russian nuclear experts have been
recruited by Iran, whose motivations were only to find housing and food and
their earnings were about $67 a month in Russia whereas Iran is offering
them $5000 a month.67
Fifth, Iran's relations with China and Russia raise concerns about
Iran's nuclear program. Prevented from accessing Western technology due
to US-led containment policy, Iran has turned to China and Russia.
Although there is strong US opposition over China and Chinese pledge not
to support Iran's nuclear program, China is still believed as the main
supplier of the Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Iran has conducted
similar negotiations with Russia and begun to seek nuclear assistance since
mid-1980s.68
Sixth, Iran is surrounded by many nuclear and potentially nuclear
neighbors, including Israel and Iraq to the west, Russia to the north, and
Pakistan, India, and China to the east. At present, with the exception of
Israel and Iraq, Iran maintains economic and political relations with all of
these countries. Should relations deteriorate with any of these countries in
the future, Iran would want the ability to deter their potential use of nuclear
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weapons against it. This feeling of nuclear encirclement could help prompt
the decision to go nuclear.
Finally, the Iranian officials' rhetoric regarding the pursuit of
nuclear weapons has been contradictory and reveals their intentions.
Generally, they dismiss weapons of mass destruction, as every rogue state
that has tried to acquire these weapons. They found them fundamentally
anti-Islamic and inhuman. However, in many statements and proclamations
of Iranian government officials, there are subtle undertones and attempts to
manipulate the international environment, though sometimes they articulate
their aim clearly.69 They have usually justified the pursuit of nuclear
weapons as a way to counter enemy's nuclear capability and remedy of
Muslim defenseless. For instance, in late 1991, one of President Rafsanjani's
deputies, Ayatollah Mohajerani said: "since the enemy has atomic
capabilities, Islamic countries must be armed with the same capacity."70 In
May 1991, after an official study on Iran's future long-term grand strategy,
Hojjat-al-Islam Mussavi-Khoiniha stated: "...If we obtain the nuclear ability,
the waves of Islamic Revolution will get a new power and liberation
movements throughout the world will look at the Islamic Republic as a new
superpower with all its ideological potentials."71 In 1988, while he was the
speaker of the Majlis, former President Rafsanjani addressed to some
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soldiers: "With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological
weapons training, it was made clear during the war that these weapons are
very decisive...We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and
defensive use of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons. From
now on you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task.72
Rafsanjani stated in 1989 that "Iran cannot afford to ignore the nuclear
factor in the modern world" and in early 1992 he also told "We seek nuclear
technology for peaceful uses and consider this path to be right of all
countries which have potential to acquire it.”73 In 1998, during his visit to
Islamabad after Pakistan's nuclear test, Iran's Foreign Minister revealed
Iran's suppressed intention: "Muslims now feel Pakistan's nuclear capability
could play a role of deterrence to Israel's nuclear capability".74 In a speech,
in June 1998, Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mohammed Yazdi declared "we are
living at a time when the US supports Israel which has the biggest arsenals
of mass destruction and nuclear weapons and an atomic power is needed in
the world of Islam to create a balance in the region."75
Iran accepts its responsibility for nuclear power facilities, but
denies claims of a nuclear weapons program as American paranoia.76 It
evaluates US rhetoric against Iran as an attempt to justify massive US arms
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sale to the other regional states and Israel. Conversely, there are some
thoughts that Iran may be provoking the US deliberately to justify its
nuclear weapon development program.77
2.4.  International Arms Control Treaties and Iran
Interestingly, Iran is a member of all of the major international
arms control agreements currently in existence. Unlike Israel, Pakistan, and
India, which have never signed and are not obligated to the NPT, Iran is a
treaty member in good standing. Iran has been one of the key advocates of
the nonproliferation regime at various international forums including the
Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva78 and the review conferences
of the NPT held every five years in New York. Iran has argued strongly on
these occasions—and with considerable support from other developing
countries—that there is a double standard in US policy concerning the
nonproliferation regime. The United States, for instance, never raises the
problem posed by Israel’s nuclear program despite the persistent rhetoric
from the Arab world that Israel’s nuclear weapons are a stimulant to Iraqi
and Iranian nuclear ambitions.
Iran ratified Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on February 20,
1970 where it is in a good standing. Iran has been a member of the IAEA.
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But it has refused to ratify the 93+2 provisions79 on the grounds that it is
still being denied civilian nuclear technology. Iran signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 24, 1996 but not
ratified yet.80 Iran ratified both Chemical Weapons Convention on
November 3, 1997 and BTWC on August 22, 1973.81
In Iran's missile case, there is no international treaty that binds
recipients of such technology. There is a Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), which is designed to prevent advanced powers from
transferring missile technology to the aspiring missile powers.82
Indeed, these international agreements that Iran already signed do
not satisfy Iran. It wants to have security guarantees and assurances that
legally bind the signatories. Iran itself has firsthand experienced that
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provisions of these agreements do not always work, as they should. In its
eight-year war, Iraq used chemical weapons and the international
community did nothing even the United Nations. This bitter experience
convinced the Iranians that international institutions, instruments and
guarantees are not useful and necessary unless you are a friend of the great
powers.
Although Iran was an advocate of international disarmament
negotiations and agreements, it was not a participant in the arms control
talks, which took place within the Middle East peace process. Iran regards
entire peace process as illegitimate due to ideological and hegemonical
reasons. On the other hand, Israel argued that without Iran serious talks on
the nuclear issue could not be undertaken. Hence, the absence of Iran was a
factor in the suspension of the talks.83 Nevertheless, Iran proposed some
arms control initiatives. The notion Iran always used in its proposals and
multilateral talks is that "outside powers" and Israel are the only causes of
all proliferation efforts in the region and this issue is the single impediment
to the realization of a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) and
regional confidence-building measures.
In sum, Iran has two aspects in its arms control policy: supporting
global talks, while blocking regional. This can be evaluated in some ways.
Iran has used its membership in international fora to prevent itself from
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charges while acquiring WMD, and to push the nuclear-weapon states both
for assisting Iran's nuclear infrastructure and for making progress towards
their commitment to negotiate the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, international environments feel that Iran is disingenuous with
its arms control policy. Its basic approach was to subscribe to and propose
arms control initiatives, while exploring every kind of WMD in the
meantime.84
2.5.  Exploring Nuclear Option
Iran's nuclear weapons programs are the top priorities of the
Islamic regime. Tehran tries to follow different ways in order to reach its
goal despite severe economic constraints and international pressure. It is
accused of pursuing the acquisition program regardless of being a signatory
to the NPT.85 Iran's nuclear program is in its early stages, however, there are
unambiguous indicators of its intention. The US, the UK, German, Russian
and Israeli intelligence services are in agreement that Iran is actively
pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The ultimate goal of the Iran's civilian
nuclear program is obtaining nuclear technology and producing indigenous
nuclear weapons clandestinely.86
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The beginning of Iran's nuclear program is stimulated by the Atoms
for Peace initiative of the Eisenhower Administration and began in 1959
under the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The Shah established an
ambitious program, called the Great Civilization aiming at raising Iran's
standard of living to those of Western Europe, that envisioned building at
least twenty three nuclear reactors throughout Iran that were to be operating
by the mid-1990s, at least one reactor by 1980. $30 billion were allocated
for materializing atomic energy development plan.87 He also sought the
military and political power of the nuclear weapons. Interestingly, his
nuclear policy displayed many similarities that of subsequent governments.
He was also an advocate of NWFZ and proposed his initiative. But, he was
slightly insincere with his proposal. In the mid-70s, he set up a special group
to study how to develop nuclear explosive device.88 While he was hiding
Iran behind the NPT and regional arms control proposals, he had a not very
secret desire to obtain the nuclear weapons production capability, for
instance, in 1974, he said that Iran would have nuclear arms "and faster than
some people think" and he told an Egyptian journalist, "Iran will have to
acquire atomic bombs if some upstart in the region gets them".89
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The Shah purchased a 5 MWt90 research reactor from the US,
which became operational in 1967. The US also supplied a 3-megaelectron
volt (MeV) accelerator in the same period.91 The Shah also sent hundreds of
students abroad to study nuclear physics and engineering to establish a corps
of trained personnel, especially to France, Germany, India, England and the
US to form a cadre of nuclear scientists and technical personnel. In 1974,
the Shah established Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and
concluded a ten-year nuclear fuel contract with the US in 1974, with
Germany in 1976, and with France in 1977. Also in 1974, he signed
contracts with the French company Framatome to build two 950 MW
pressurized water reactors in Karun (Darkhovin) and in 1976 with German
Kraftwerk Union (KWU) to build two Siemens 1300 MWe reactors at
Bushehr. In 1975, he purchased a 10 percent share in Eurodif, a joint
venture of France, Belgium, Spain and Italy.92
During the Shah's reign, Iran worked on, at the Amirabad Nuclear
Research Center, a nuclear weapons research program, made a secret
reprocessing research efforts to use enriched uranium, and set up a nuclear
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weapons design team.93 It obtained 27-kilowatt research reactor in Isfahan.
It signed a secret contract to buy "yellow cake"94 from the South Africa,
tried to purchase 26.2 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and
made very complex and illegal efforts to obtain needed technology from the
US. Accordingly, Iran worked on every way to obtain nuclear weapons
technology during the Shah's reign.95
The Shah fell in January 1979. By the time his overthrown, he had
six reactors under contract, and was attempting to purchase a total of twelve
reactors from Germany, France, and the US. Two plants at Bushehr were
already 60 percent and 75 percent (according to some sources 80-85
percent) completed. The site preparation work of the first of two French
plants had begun at Darkhovin.96
The nuclear efforts of the Shah raised concerns in the West.
However, due to the yet insufficient infrastructure and the lack of scientific
accumulation and skilled personnel in the country, it was not believed that
Iran could make any substantial achievements and produce nuclear
weapons. Furthermore, in those years, Iran was considered to be one of the
"three pillars" of the US in the Middle East, together with Egypt and Israel.
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In 1979, because of the Islamic Revolution, nuclear development
programs were shelved and all foreign and most of the Iranian nuclear
specialists left the country.97 Although the new Islamic Revolutionary
government stalled much of the Shah's nuclear programs, it kept the core of
Iran's nuclear research efforts alive. With the Iran-Iraq War, the nuclear
weapons program revived since Iran was exposed to Iraq's WMD. The
Khomeini government provided new funds to the research teams. During
this period, with Khomeini's personal directives, Iran's nuclear energy
program had fully turned into the development of a nuclear weapon.98
In 1984, Iran built a new nuclear weapons research center near
Isfahan, which was not declared to the IAEA until 1992. This facility was
far beyond the needs of peaceful nuclear research. Iran sought French and
Pakistani help and it may have obtained uranium dioxide from Argentina
through Algeria for this center.99 Iran couldn't get a research reactor from
France or Pakistan. However, it obtained a subcritical research reactor from
China in 1985 and a small calutron to use in enrichment procedure in
1987.100
In 1984, Iran restarted its work at the Bushehr reactor. But
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rebuilding efforts of the reactor suffered major setbacks due to Iraqi air
bombings, which occurred seven times between 1984 and 1987.101
In May 1987, Argentina sold 5.5 million worth of uranium for
Amirabad Nuclear Research Center and agreed to train Iranian technicians.
Owing to the US pressure, Argentina's new government canceled $18
million nuclear technology sale, announcing in February 1992. However,
the nuclear cooperation between Iran and Argentina continued during 1987
and 1988.102
Regardless of many difficulties, Iran engaged in all activities that it
might obtain fissile material it needs. In 1987, Iran signed a nuclear
cooperation agreement with Pakistan. The Iranian nuclear specialists began
to get training in this country, and Dr. Abdul Kadr Han, "the father of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program", visited Tehran and Bushehr in 1986
and 1987. Some reports, which Pakistan denied, claimed that Pakistan
provided Iran aid in creating a nuclear center at Kazmin, and in developing
plutonium extraction and other weapon technologies. It also denied Iranian
request to provide nuclear weapons technology.103 Such reports about
Pakistan's contribution to the Iranian nuclear weapons efforts were not
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substantiated and died away.104
In February 1990, Iran contacted with KWU and CENA of
Germany and some Spanish firms for the completion of the two nuclear
power plants at Bushehr. It also tried to import reactor parts illegally from
Siemens in Germany and Skoda in Czechoslovakia. Iran was all
unsuccessful, but these efforts display the depth of its nuclear interest.
In 1991, Iran bought a 30 MeV cyclotron from Belgian Ion Beam
Applications at a facility in Karaj. Also, in 1991, Iran conducted
experiments in nuclear-related technology at its Sharif University of
Technology, which was linked to efforts to import specialized ring magnets
from German Thyssen Company that can be used as a gas centrifuge
component.105
Iran also sought new nuclear power plants from India, which
seemed to have offered Iran a 10 MW reactor.106 Furthermore, Iran was
trying to obtain a 220 MW reactor, and even signed the contract on
November 11, 1991. After the US intervention, India delayed or halted the
deal, though.107
In September 1992, Iran approached South Korea to make the
Bushehr reactors rebuild, and South Korea sent a survey team to Iran for the
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project.
In spite of its unsuccessful efforts, Iran kept going on search for
nuclear technology. Therefore, it is clear from Iran's import efforts that it
has sought nuclear technology ever since. In 1993, eight steam condensers
bound for Iran were seized by Italian inspectors at Porto Marghera. These
condensers could be used in a covert reactor program. In January 1994, at
the Port of Bari, high technology ultrasound equipment for reactor testing
was also seized.
As Iran continued its efforts to obtain nuclear technology, the
International Atomic Energy Organizations conducted a limited inspection
of six Iranian sites in February 1992, which found no sign of nuclear
weapons research activity. But, International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) only performed a familiarization tour.108 The IAEA visits were not
inspections, and do not use instruments, cameras, seals, etc. There were only
informal walkthroughs, and the team may have been led to a decoy site. Iran
also let a new IAEA team visit in November 1993. Like the previous
mission, it was not a full inspection one, and was not equipped and
organized to discover covert Iranian activities. It could not examine all of
the activities in all research facilities but allowed sites. Moreover, in the
allowed sites, the IAEA was not given enough access to soil and particle
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samples.109
The US, German, Russian intelligence services revealed the
existence of a smuggling network developed by Iranians to get technology
and equipment needed for nuclear weapons program.110 During 1992 and
1993, there were some reports that Iran has hired many former Soviet
scientists, bought weapons-grade material from the former Soviet Union
states, and bought nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan. None of these reports
has been confirmed and there has been no indication.111
On the other hand, China and Russia didn't hesitate to give Iran
needed technology, expertise, and infrastructure to produce weapon grade
fissile material. Consequently, two states contributed to Iran's nuclear
programs which have been the only major nuclear supplier states willing to
transfer nuclear exports to Iran publicly.
Since early 1995, Iranian efforts to advance its nuclear program
and US-led efforts to obstruct and isolate Iran more generally have
continued mutually. While other states might join the US in expressions of
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concern about Iran's nuclear and missile programs, they have not curtailed
all their trading practices.112 The US expanded its sanctions and contrived
partially to stop China and Russia of their planned nuclear transfers to Iran.
In October 1997, China agreed to terminate its nuclear projects and not to
provide new assistance. In contrast, the US has mostly failed in dealing with
Russian assistance to Iran.113
Although China and Russia are the major suppliers of Iran's WMD
and delivery systems, both countries know very well that a powerful Iran
will constitute a risk for them as their interests clash in the Caucasus and the
Central Asian zone. Hence, both Russia  and China exploit the ambitions of
Iran in a rather controlled manner. On the other hand, China uses Iran as a
leverage in its relations with the US. Besides, by being intensive
cooperation, China may control Iran's moves in the Muslim sectors of its
territory in particular and also in Central Asia at large.114
2.6.  Iran's Nuclear Cooperation with Russia
Iran is the most important state for Russia in the Middle East.
Iran’s strategic location on the Persian Gulf, its importance as a trading
partner, and its ties and interests in the former Soviet republics in Central
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Asia and Transcaucasia have all drawn Moscow’s close attention. Russia
valued Iran as an important market for Russian arms and nuclear reactors,
and as a way to demonstrate independence from the United States. The two
countries also shared an interest in checking Turkey’s influence in Central
Asia and Transcaucasia, in opposing Taliban forces in Afghanistan, and in
containing Azerbaijani irredentism and independence. In addition, Iran
needed Russia’s diplomatic aid in the face of US isolation. Besides, it wants
to balance US influence with Russia.115
Iran first began to seek nuclear technology from the former Soviet
Union in late-1980s, gaining significant progress. Thus, Iran was able to
develop its nuclear program further and create its nuclear infrastructure and
expertise by the help of Russian experts and companies in mid-1990s.
Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and Russian firms and
research institutes continued with determination to transfer nuclear
technology and materials to Iran. In short, Russia wants to revive its ailing
influence and economy in the Gulf region via Iran by exporting arms and
technology, in turn Iran wants to buy, in spite of its financial limitations.116
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Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran began with an agreement in
1992. According to the agreement, Minatom would complete Bushehr
reactor and make a feasibility study for building new reactors. Besides, it
would give operational training at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant.
Minatom would also train Iranian physicists and mathematicians at the
Institute of Engineering and Physics.117 On January 8, 1995, Iran and Russia
signed a contract to complete at least one unit of Bushehr reactors by 2000,
installing a Soviet-designed VVER-1000 reactor at a cost of approximately
$940 million. If the Bushehr project has been successful, Iran would buy
three additional VVER reactors, one 1000 MW light water and two 440
MW reactors.118 Two countries also agreed on a 30 to 50 MWt light-water
research reactor. Furthermore, Russia would train 10 to 20 scientific
personnel annually,119 provide low enriched uranium fuel for a period of 10
years starting in 2001 at an annual cost of $30 million,120deliver 2000 tons
of natural uranium, supply a uranium enrichment facility, construct a
uranium mine, and build a desalination plant.121
Just as the facts in the contract revealed, tensions rose between
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Russia and the US. The US argued that Iran would gain experience
necessary for creating nuclear weapons whereas Russia views this
consideration unjustified and unfair. Russia thought that Iran had right to
obtain peaceful nuclear energy and rejected the argument that Iran does not
need nuclear power due to Iran's vast oil and gas reserves. In addition
Russian officials claimed that Iran observed NPT and fulfilled its
obligations under international law. They have usually stated that the IAEA
has not found Iran in violation of its NPT commitments.122 Indeed, Russia
has been trying to justify its assistance, but misses the possibility of Iran's
withdrawal from NPT, even its probability is small. Russian authorities also
asserted that US opposition to nuclear reactors sale was due to commercial
jealousy, nothing else.123
On April 30, 1995, the US declared new and tougher sanctions
toward Iran to curtail its ability to develop nuclear weapons and its
continued support of terrorism as a state policy. Determined US resolve
influenced President Yeltsin who decided to cancel the transfer of a
uranium-enrichment facility to Iran, which was the most dangerous element
of the deal.124 The equipment and technology used in this plant could be
applied to the production of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium. On the
other hand, Yeltsin refused to renounce all of the provisions of the protocol.
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In the meantime, it was reported in June 1997 that Iran obtained new
nuclear technology from Russia during the previous year.
In 1996, Ukrainian Turboatom, manufacturer of steam turbines,
signed a contract with a Russian firm to supply two turbines worth of $45
million for the Bushehr reactor. The US persuaded Ukraine not to sell Iran
nuclear plant turbines and to increase its controls on Ukrainian missile
technology under MTCR. So the deal was canceled.125
The first 1000 MW reactor at Bushehr has experienced serious
construction delays due to financial problems. In February 1998, Iran had
agreed to fund improved safety systems. It is reported that the reactor is to
be on a 30-month completion cycle. In March 1998, Russia and Iran
renewed their nuclear cooperation agreement. After the intensive and
continuing the US pressure, Russia has agreed to observe certain limitations
on its nuclear cooperation with Iran, not providing militarily useful nuclear
technology. In January 1998, Russian government prohibited its companies
from exporting items for developing WMD or related delivery systems. It
was not important whether or not these items known or believed as useful
for nuclear technology and they are on Russia's export control list. Four
months later, the government strengthened compliance of Russian business
with existing export controls on proliferation related items, however, there
are some strong signals that Russian entities have continued not to involve
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in consistent behavior with these steps. For instance, in February 1999, the
US announced sanctions against two Russian firms, as well as eight others,
which negotiated with Iran to sell 40 MWt heavy water research reactor,
which would significantly increase Iran's capability to produce plutonium
for nuclear weapons.126
In January 1999, the CIA indicated that Russia was still a key
supplier for Iranian civil nuclear programs and Russian assistance would
enhance Iran's nuclear weapons development technology.
Russia had still thoughts about finishing Bushehr project, in spite
of US pressure. As a result, at US urging, Russia refused to provide Iran a
heavy-water system as well as it was convinced to stipulate Iran that spent
fuel from the reactor would be returned to Russia. The latter could prevent
Iranian diversion of plutonium efforts. Besides, a Russian official described
Bushehr nuclear reactor as "on hold for right now", because of lack of
finance and inconclusive commercial arrangements with the AEOI. Due to
delays, the projected date for completing Bushehr had been postponed to
2003.127
On January 14, 2000, in Moscow, Russian Minister of Defense
during his meeting with the Secretary of Iran's National Security Council,
promised that Russia would maintain defense cooperation and "intends to
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fulfill its obligations under the agreements". The same day, Russia's vice
Minister met with the Secretary, and announced that Iran might order three
additional Russian reactors. Also, in January 2000, the CIA warned that
Russia might have sold Iran nuclear-related technology.128
In December 2000, Russian Defense Minister visited Iran in the
first high level Russian visit since the Islamic Revolution. The Russian
Minister stated that two countries would give an end to the pause in military
cooperation. Russia and the US had signed a secret agreement in 1995
where Russia had agreed to halt most conventional arms sales to Iran within
five years. The secret agreement had become public during the 2000
elections. In November 2000, Kremlin warned White House that it was
abandoning the 1995 pledge. Also, Moscow has dismissed US demands that
it cancel the Bushehr contract. While the US claims the technology in
Bushehr plant could be used for nuclear weapon development, Moscow and
Tehran say that the plant can be used only for civilian purposes. Moreover,
Russia says that it has abided by international agreements banning the
proliferation of both nuclear weapon and missile technologies.
Last but not least, Iran's President M. Khatami visited Moscow on
March 12, 2001. The first broad cooperation agreement was signed between
two countries since 1979. It pledges increased cooperation in the nuclear
sphere and increased Russian arms transfer to Iran. The nuclear cooperation
was beyond Russia's current construction of a reactor at Bushehr plant.
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Russia's President Vladimir Putin made a statement that Russia will
continue to sell conventional weapons and will finish the completion of the
Bushehr nuclear plant.129 The new Russian President has also ended its
agreement with the US on restraints on conventional arms sales to
Iran.130On the other hand, the US strongly opposed to the military and
nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran131 and warned Russia that its
planned arms and nuclear deals with Iran could endanger Russia's support in
the West.132
2.7.  Iran's Nuclear Cooperation with China
In the 1980s, China was the largest single military supplier of Iran,
reaching about one third of its import.133 Iran approached to and
strengthened its nuclear research ties with People's Republic of China,
which has been one of the key suppliers of nuclear-related technologies.
China's nuclear cooperation with Iran began in mid-1980s. In 1985, China
supplied two subcritical training. It built a heavy water zero power research
reactor. In late 1980s, it has sold a small electromagnetic isotope separation
(EMIS) machine, called calutron and used in uranium enrichment. None of
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the hardware is believed to be able to produce more than minute quantities
of weapon grade material. But they present proliferation concerns, as they
are useful for training personnel, and could be reverse engineered.
Additionally, some fifteen Iranian engineers employed in Isfahan center,
were trained in China. The two countries made a broad nuclear research
cooperation agreement in 1990. On January 21, 1991, they made a contract
to build a 27-kilowatt miniature neutron source research reactor at Iran's
nuclear weapons research facility at Isfahan.134 China supplied the reactor as
well as 900 g highly enriched uranium and heavy water in 1994.135
Additionally, Iran was reported to have signed a deal to buy two
300 MWe light-water reactors from China to build at Ahvaz during former
President Rafsanjani's visit in March, 1992. As a result of the US
intervention, the sale was deferred, but there were reports about the
substantial numbers of Chinese nuclear experts were working in Iran and the
so-called deferred sale may still go through.
On July 4, 1994, Iran and China announced that they signed an
agreement for China to build a 300 MW reactor near Tehran. In late 1995,
Chinese reactor sale was suspended because of difficulties over site
selection, Iran's difficulties in rising financing, and most likely strong US
pressure.
                                                                                                                       
2000, p. 69.
134 Bates Gill, "Chinese Arms Exports to Iran", Middle East Review of
International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 1998, pp. 8-9.
135 David A. Schwarzbach, "Nuclear Weapons Databook Series: Iran's Nuclear
Program: Energy or Weapons?", op. cit., p. 6.
59
Although China had abandoned its contracted sales to Iran, the US
still saw China as the main source of Iranian proliferation. It was still
assisting Iran with the construction of a plant near Isfahan. In November
1996, the Chinese government reportedly indicated that it might cancel its
deal with Iran, as a sign of its compliance with the US nonproliferation
laws. In March 1997, a Chinese official confirmed the suspension of Iranian
uranium conversion plant sale. To achieve US certification and to gain
access to advanced US nuclear technology under the 1985 US-China
nuclear cooperation agreement, the Chinese government agreed that China
would provide Iran no further nuclear assistance.136 Chinese assurances
include the end of cruise missile sale and missile related technology transfer
to Iran. China strengthened its pledge in negotiations with the US in
February 1998, on the other hand, in March 1998; it was negotiating to sell
Iran nuclear related material. Then, it agreed to halt the sale while Iran
denied the elimination. On March 26, 1998, the US officials stated that
China was keeping its pledge not to help Iran. In January 2000, Iranian
authorities announced that Iran is no longer working with China on nuclear
projects.137
In February 1996, the Clinton Administration signed two additional
legislation aimed at constraining Iranian WMD programs. The US efforts to
dissuade nuclear suppliers seemed to have had success.
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Meanwhile, a new era began in Iran with the March 1996
parliamentary elections, where moderates made significant progress, which
did not alter the Iranian nuclear posture, though there were hopes of gradual
opening of Iran to the West and abating its acquisition efforts. Hence the US
efforts to block nuclear transfers to Iran intensified subsequent months.
When Iran was seeking $40 million international bids on eleven major
energy projects, the Clinton Administration increased economic pressure on
Iran with secondary sanctions in August 1996.
The US also increased its pressure on Russia to halt its work to
complete Bushehr nuclear plant, but gained no success. Meanwhile, as
Washington tried to make Chinese and Russian exports to Iran stop, Iran's
nuclear development program continued clandestinely. In August 1996, a
ship carrying maraging steel, useful for the manufacture of early-generation
European design G1 and G2 uranium-enrichment centrifuges and ordered by
the Iranian armed forces, was intercepted by British customs officials at the
Port of Barking, in London.138
In May 1997, moderate Mohammed Khatami was elected president
of Iran. This raised hopes of easing tensions between the US and Iran.
President Clinton stated that Iran would have to overcome three big
difficulties for reconciliation: supporting terrorism, efforts to wreck a peace
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process in the Middle East, and developing WMD.139 On the other hand,
blaming the US,140 Khatami stated that Iran is also willing for a dialogue if
the US shows its sincerity and good faith, which are lifting sanctions and
giving up terrorism charges.141 As a sign of flexibility, the US took a few
steps such as the deferring sanctions against energy companies involved in
deals with Iran, lifting some trade bans, and offering Iran a path of
reconciliation.142 Some experts indicated one of the reasons of the gestures
might be the fright of the US that Iran may find itself in a blind alley and
have recourse to terrorism as a response to highly increasing pressures.
The new Khatami government took an important step, which was
related with the future course of the Iranian nuclear program. Khatami
replaced Reza Amrollahi with Gholam Reza Aghazadeh as president of the
AEOI. Aghazadeh was also appointed as vice President. This change was
raised new speculations in the international disarmament fora. Some argued
that it is a sign of growing opposition within the parliament to the nuclear
projects; however, some believe that Amrollahi showed management
ineffectiveness that allegedly had caused delays in the nuclear weapons
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program of Iran.143 The latter considerations are more likely to happen since
Khatami has accelerated Iran's both nuclear and missile programs when
elected as President of Iran.144
It is difficult to predict when Mullahs will cross the nuclear
threshold. Therefore, estimates on when Iran will have nuclear weapons are
different. Many of them are pessimistic, often suggesting that acquisition
would happen by 2000. Despite significant efforts since 1996, Iran has made
a limited progress in development process. Given the program's current
success, it is difficult to rely on intelligence services, which claim that Iran
might require 7 to 10 years.145 Unless Tehran acquire sufficient quantities of
weapon-grade fissile material on the black market, Iran is likely to have
atomic bomb in 10 to 15 years.146
2.8.  Problems Encountered Iran's Nuclear Program
The greatest barrier to Iran's nuclear weapons program is the
acquisition of fissile material. The key to build a nuclear weapon is getting
fissile material, either indigenous production of HEU and separated
plutonium or gaining them from abroad clandestinely. Evidences have
revealed that Iran has explored both routes to produce needed fissile
                                                
143 Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons", op. cit., p. 4.
144 Patrick Clawson, "How the US Can Bolster Reform in Iran", The Wall Street
Journal, 16 July 1999, p. A14.
145 W. Seth Carus, "Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction", Middle East Review
of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3, Fall 2000, p. 58.
146 Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, "Iran's Nuclear Procurement Program: How
Close to the Bomb?"op. cit., p. 130.
63
material. Although The Non-proliferation Treaty is intended to halt the
spread of nuclear weapons by controlling sensitive technologies, there are
alternative ways to acquire fissile material, particularly in the disarray
created by the former Soviet Union. Likewise, the IAEA mechanisms were
designed to be effective, while Iran has succeeded to have alternative routes.
Therefore arms control treaties are not able to prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear capabilities.
Iran's scientific and technical base remains insufficient to support
its nuclear programs seriously. Attempts have been continued to repatriate
exiled Iranian scientists and technicians, to obtain foreign know-how by
recruiting non-Iranian experts,147 and to encourage younger Iranians to
study abroad to gain technical assistance. So gaining access to nuclear-
related technology and to develop it are obstacles for Iran.
International efforts, the US-led embargo, to stop Iranian nuclear
program have been hurdles to leap. The US efforts to curtail foreign nuclear
sales intensified by the time when Iraqi nuclear program was revealed after
the Gulf War. Consequently, constraints imposed by Western technology
transfer controls have at least slowed and reduced Iran's capabilities,
increasing the cost. Still, it is highly unlikely that such efforts will
completely stop Iran's nuclear programs, because of the Chinese and
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Russian factors.148 Although the procurement efforts of key items and
solving technical design problems have been under strict scrutiny by
intelligence services, export control organizations and the IAEA, Iran
succeeded to promote its nuclear weapons program.
Iran, like Iraq, has pursued a covert strategy and tried to build its
nuclear infrastructure underground in protected and camouflaged sites along
the Gulf coast,149 probably with the help of experienced North Korea. As
production of HEU and separation of plutonium need significantly different
infrastructures, it will be very difficult to build them clandestinely. Secret
facilities would require dual-use technologies and high-precision equipment
that careful monitoring could detect, particularly if the country in question is
suspected of wanting nuclear weapons. In addition, this non-peaceful
process can easily be uncovered due to the size and complexity of the
nuclear facilities and the trace of the chemicals used. Once it is revealed,
Iran should predict the risk of a possible Israeli and US strike to its nuclear
infrastructure.
Nuclear weapons program can only be succeeded with an
integration of high politics and grand science. Intense political partition in
Iran, in contrast to that of Iraq, limits the ability to maintain necessary
direction and coordination. Such factionalism is deeply embedded in the
political structure and has a very negative impact on defining domestic and
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foreign policy agenda. It would be impossible for Iranian politics to decide
the responsibility of nuclear program. Most reports indicate that the nuclear
program is under the authority of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, but
Defense Ministry was involved in some foreign procurement and possible
nuclear weapons work at the military sites. Some reports revealed that
Revolutionary Guard has an independent, nuclear weapons effort.
Meanwhile, Ministry of Energy is involved in the program as in the Bushehr
projects, which will profit from the sale of the electricity. An Iranian daily
newspaper reported that there were 80 nuclear projects under way.150
Therefore scarce human and financial resources have not been used
effectively.
2.9.  Iran's Ballistic Missile Program
Iranians see the possession of long-range ballistic missiles as vital
for Iran’s security. Like its nuclear program, Iran also has an ambitious
long-range missile development program. Iran regards its missile program
as a significant adjunct of its political and security policy. It has commenced
development of a broad missile infrastructure since starting under Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Like the Shah, Iranian authorities, including both
moderates and conservatives, agree on one thing: weapons of mass
destruction have been a necessary component of defense and a high
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priority.151
Iranian officials have stated publicly that Iran possesses powerful
ballistic-missile capability and do not deny reports on their interests to
obtain ballistic missiles by manufacturing indigenously but deny any outside
assistance. They have expressed clearly that Iran's intentions have been to
develop their own missiles, including the Persian Gulf within the range, not
longer. In fact, Iranians want longer-range ballistic missiles, capable of
reaching the US. By acquiring domestic ballistic missiles, Iran would be
able to deter primarily Iraq, Israel and the US from attacking Iran or even
those countries friendly with Iran.152
Iran's parallel effort of ballistic missiles with its nuclear program
creates a major concern and justifies international claims on Iran's nuclear
weapons. Most observers agree that, as a means of delivery, Iran's quest for
ballistic missiles is directly related to its WMD programs, particularly
nuclear weapons programs. Because, acquiring only missiles for
conventional munitions are not cost-effective. In order to benefit from their
offensive utility and psychological effect, they should be employed with a
nuclear, chemical or biological warhead.
During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran suffered severely from Iraq's ballistic
missiles and rockets. It was the "War of the Cities" that wounded Iran most.
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Iraq launched almost 200 missiles at Tehran, Isfahan and Qom, which
caused 2000 deaths, 8000 injuries and an important economic damage.
Hundreds of thousands of Iranians fled the cities. This damage revealed the
Iran's lack of effective defense and deterrence. Tehran could not find
enough means to retaliate and sustain a prolonged missile offensive153 while
Iranian officials had considerably exaggerated their own capabilities in the
mid-1980s. This humiliating situation incited Iran's attempts to develop and
acquire long-range ballistic missiles as a future deterrent or retaliatory
capability. Iran's desire is motivated by Iraq's ballistic missile developments
and by a general missile proliferation in the region. Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Syria, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq are all known to have long-range
ballistic missiles.154
During the Gulf War, Iranian officials were highly impressed by
the psychological effects and urban destruction caused by Iraqi ballistic
missiles in Israel and by the excessive amount of time that coalition aircraft
spent to look unsuccessfully for Scud launchers. After the Gulf War, Iran
allocated more investment in mass production of ballistic missiles with great
destructive power to deter enemy against striking economic and urban
centers.
Additionally, Iran has not yet repaired its wartime losses, which
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combined with the US containment policy. Arms acquisition and military
expenditure of Iran remained well below those of the GCC.155 Iran felt
inferiority in this area, particularly in the number and availability of its
aircraft. The countries in the region have more modern and sophisticated
combat aircraft than Iran since Western countries are willing to transfer
advanced arms to the region except Iran. Iran sees ballistic missiles as a
substitute for advanced combat aircraft. Advanced combat aircraft are very
expensive and require constant support. The latter creates a problem when
the supplier’s reliability is in doubt. In contrast, missiles are relatively easy
to manufacture domestically, which helps Iran meet its goals. They
compensate lack of flexibility in their relatively low cost, ease of
concealment, the assurance of penetration, and the lack of the need to train
pilots. In addition, missiles are high-prestige materials that demonstrate
Iran’s technical sophistication. Thus, developing ballistic missiles with
conventional and nonconventional warheads are vital for deterrence.
Iran started to develop its missile program with great efforts in
1984-1985. Its initial goal was acquiring surface-to-surface missiles to
oppose Iraq. In order to obtain missile production capability, Iran turned to
China, gaining the capability to assemble Chinese artillery rocket at a
Chinese built and equipped facility at Semnan (Oghab), east of Tehran.
Also, Iran openly purchased missiles from North Korea, China, Libya and
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Syria. It obtained a small number of Scud Bs from Libya and Syria to use as
a retaliation against Iraq. Since 1985, after deciding to invest in an
indigenous capability, Iran has sought relationship with China and
particularly with North Korea. The development programs were co-funded
by Iran. Following an agreement with North Korea in 1985 to transfer
manufacturing know-how for Scud missiles, Iran achieved the production
capability of its artillery rockets and the construction of a facility for the
Scud B. Moreover in early 1990, Iran bought 100-200 missiles from North
Korea and received further assistance to establish missile production
facilities and to train Iranians. Some of these missiles were Scud Cs,
provided Iran the basis for an indigenous Scud-C program.156 Scuds gave
Iran the ability to threaten US forces in the Gulf, to attack key oil
installations and ports.157  After obtaining North Korean Scud Cs, a variant
of Scud B with 500 km range, Iran acquired the capability of production of
better missiles, particularly with the assistance of China. Due to Scud
missiles, Iran has created basic infrastructure to produce liquid fuel ballistic
missiles. Besides, North Korea helped Iran conceal its missile facilities from
any air strike and reconnaissance, digging in underground facilities. The
Iranians got training and assistance from experienced North Korean
engineers for years the Iranians have been installing high-priority research,
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manufacturing, storage and missile launch facilities in underground bases.158
In late 1989, Iran imported 200 Chinese CSS-8 short-range ballistic
missiles. Meanwhile, Iran increased its efforts to acquire longer-range
ballistic missile. Following the delivery of 100 North Korean Scud B
missiles in 1988, Iran received further 200-300 Scud Bs. In 1991 and again
in 1992, China and Iran made an agreement to transfer complete M-11
missiles to Iran, but the deal was canceled, modified or postponed because
of US pressure on China. Nevertheless, some reports indicated that China
and Iran had signed a $5-billion deal that covered the transfer of 600 M-11
missiles. There was no sign whether the delivery had been performed. But,
something was clear that China has provided expertise, technology, and
production equipment related to M-9 and M-11 ballistic missile programs.
Consequently, Iran has developed variants of these systems and has gained
further capabilities by receiving Chinese guidance, gyroscope, and solid fuel
technology as well as precision machine tools for its indigenous missile
programs. As a result of this aid, the development of domestic Zelzal-3159
with 1500 km range and 1000 kg payload, which has solid-fuel missile
technology that Iran, received from Germany and China.160 Iran's Scud Bs
and Scud Cs are liquid-fueled while solid-fuel M-9 and M-11 engines will
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give Iran a significant greater operational flexibility.
China's most significant contribution to Iran's ballistic missile
expertise, training, and technology has been its cooperation in the
construction of production sites. Iran's largest missile production facility,
located near Isfahan, was originally built by North Korea, with the
assistance of China. It also helped Iran build a ballistic missile plant and test
range near Tehran. Besides its contribution to the Iranian production of
Chinese designed ballistic missiles, China, together with North Korea, has
reportedly provided Iran with technical assistance for indigenous ones.161
2.10.  Iran's Relations With North Korea
The military balance on the Korean peninsula was fairly stable until
the North began actively pursuing its offensive NBC and ballistic missile
capability. With these programs, it has sought to extract diplomatic
advantage from the US, as well as to threaten US forces and allies
throughout the region. At the center of this threat is North Korea's
aggressive ballistic missile program. North Korea reverse-engineered the
300 km Scud B missile and developed the 500 km range Scud C missile.
The No Dong, which reportedly is being funded by Iran and Libya, will
have a 1,000-1,300 km range. This missile, flight tested in 1993, would
allow North Korea to put at risk all US forces in South Korea and most of
Japan. According to former CIA Director John Deutch, the No Dong must
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have been deployed by the end of 1996. In addition, Pyongyang is also
developing the Taepo Dong 1 and 2. The CIA Nonproliferation Center's
March 1995 report indicated that the Taepo Dong 1 and 2 would have
ranges of several thousand kilometers. Other estimates of the Taepo Dong
2's range are even larger. With a 4,000 km range capability, North Korea
can target Hawaii and all of Alaska. With a 6,000 km range, it could
threaten Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Until 1996, the CIA
position was that the Taepo Dong 1 and 2 missiles could be deployable by
2001. However, the missile development programs failed to achieve the
milestones needed to meet that schedule, and the intelligence community
currently estimates slower progress.162
North Korea has become a key supplier to other rogue states that
have not yet perfected their indigenous ballistic missile production
capabilities.163 North Korea has sold Scuds to Iran and Libya. North Korea
has also assisted Iraq and Syria with their missile programs and may be
helping other rogue states such as Libya. Additionally, estimates that North
Korea had extracted sufficient fissile material from its illicit nuclear
program to manufacture one to two weapons in recent years, mean that
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North Korea may have the capability to threaten or actually attack US forces
or allies with nuclear weapons or with radiological weapons which spread
radioactive material.164
Relations between North Korea and Iran in the ballistic missile
realm have raised concerns about proliferation. In spring 1993, an Iranian
delegation visited North Korea and concluded a contract for the delivery of
145 No Dong ballistic missiles which has a range over 1000 km and
production technology. According to some unconfirmed reports, this
contract was suspended or terminated. However, it was clear that Iran has
been supplying money to North Korean missile development program in
exchange for missiles and related technology.165
At last, Iran developed its own ballistic missile called Shahab-3,166
and tested it three times, once on July 22, 1998,167 the second on July, 15,
2000, and lastly on September 21, 2000. It has a range of 1300 km and a
payload of about 750 kg, which was a derivative of the North Korean No
Dong 1 and developed with the help of Russia. It can easily reach Israel,
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which has a distance of 1020 km from Iran.168 With Shahab-3, Iran would
also be capable of striking, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and parts of Russia169 and
could change the regional stability dynamics in the Middle East.170
The first and third tests of the missile were reportedly unsuccessful
whereas the second was a success, exploding after a few seconds after
launching, which demonstrates the unreliability of the missile. For a reliable
deterrent it needs more successful tests as well as much time. However,
Iran's technical assistance from North Korea, China and Russia can
significantly shorten this time interval. The third test in September 2000
raised further US concerns that China has been continuing to sell
components and know-how to Iran, despite US objections.171
In addition to Shahab-3, Iran continued to seek longer-range
missiles and to seek further foreign assistance. On November 21, 1999,
North Korea supplied Iran with 12 medium range ballistic missile
engines.172 After having necessary material, Iran is reportedly developing a
Shahab-4 ballistic missile with a range of 2000 km and a payload of 1000
kg, which may be North Korean two-stage Taepo Dong 1 derivative. It was
tested in 1989 in North Korea as a three-stage space launch vehicle (SLV).
Shahab-4 may also be a derivative of the Russian SS-4, or a combination of
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both. With a lighter payload and a third stage it could reach all of the
Western Europe and western China.173
The Shahab-5, a derivative of North Korean Taepo Dong 2, is
sometimes described as an SLV. Taepo Dong 2, in a two stage
configuration, has a capacity of reaching 6000 km range and delivering
1000 kg payload, namely it can target London and any point in Western
Europe when launched within Iran. It is estimated that Iran could develop in
the near future a three-stage Shahab-5 with the assistance and technology of
Russia. Iran is likely to test an SLV in this decade that is by 2010.174 Thus,
Tehran will be an ICBM capable state that can hit many part of the US.175
These longer-range missile projects are probably based on Russian rather
than Chinese technology.176
Recently, state-run Tehran radio reported that Iran successfully
tested its first solid-fueled surface-to-surface missile. Called Fateh-110
(Victorious), the missile was developed at the government-owned
Aerospace Industries. The radio report said "Fateh-110, a super-modern
surface-to-surface missile, functions with combined solid-fuel, is able to
cause great damage and finds targets with accuracy. The missile is classified
among Iran's most efficient missiles.'' The broadcast did not say the missile's
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range, when the test took place or any further details. No official made an
explanation or comment.177
Currently, Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure includes a missile
plant near Semnan, built by China, larger plants at Isfahan and Sirjan, built
by North Korea, which can produce liquid fuels, and some structural
components, and missile test facilities at Shahroud and Shahid Hemat
Industrial Group research facilities.178 Iran has all metal processing
machinery and industrial equipment necessary to manufacture its own
ballistic missiles, but lacks technology of control and guidance system.179
Iran's efforts are to fill this gap by transferring necessary technology from
abroad. China, North Korea and Russia continue to assist Iran in guidance
and control systems, despite strong US opposition.180
Iranian ballistic missile program mostly depends on Russian know-
how. Thus, Russia has been working to increase its influence in the Middle
East. Moscow consistently denied that it is helping Iran. It is obvious that, in
any event, no legal missile component or related equipment exports have
been officially acknowledged. However, it is more obvious that reports
continue to surface that Russian government assisted Iranian efforts and met
their demands as well as it has turned a blind eye to the activities of Russian
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defense companies.181 Russia makes the deliveries of missile equipment to
Iran, violating international agreements and bypassing Russian official
structures.182 Indeed, Russian entities have been a key source of advanced
technology for Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 programs. Since January 1997, they
have provided Iran with high-strength steel and special alloys,
manufacturing equipment, wind tunnel testing equipment, missile engine,
and guidance technology.183 On the other hand, the US accused Moscow
that Russia has been violating MTCR, which Russia adopted in 1993, and it
has not the ability to enforce its own export rules. Kremlin has done little
about its responsibility. Hence, there is no reason to have confidence in
Russian assurances.184 For instance, in late March 1998, the US officials
notified Moscow that the shipment of 22 tons of special steel alloys, for
making fuel tanks of Shahab-3 missiles, were about the leave Moscow. The
Russians failed to stop. Finally, Azerbaijani customs officers seized the
truck just before it crossed the border into Iran. The transfer of materials
could have significantly enhanced Iran's ability to produce its own
missiles.185 Furthermore, there were clear evidences that Russia's Federal
Security Service involved in advanced aerospace training of Iranian
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weapons scientists and Moscow continued to give training and to test
missile components in Iran. To make a long story short, Russia keeps going
to aid Iran's ballistic missile program, including transfers and direct
assistance in training.186
The top priority of Iran is to acquire necessary know-how and
material and technical basis from other countries while Iranian Defense
Minister has recently said his country has a domestic missile industry and
needs no foreign technology. Owing to the US pressure on missile supplier
states, it is increasingly important to make Iran's missile program
independent. Indigenous production also enables Iran to avoid consequences
of MTCR. Additionally, with its own production, Iran in the next few years
may be able to sell complete Scuds and Shahab-3s and related technology
for capital or barter for other weaponry.187
2.11.  Problems Encountered Iran's Missile Programs
After 25 years of ballistic missile research, Iran obtained an
important technical capacity for and indigenous production. Although Iran
overcame many obstacles, it should cope with some significant problems.
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Iran tested Shahab-3 three times, resulting with a partial success.
Ballistic missile experts stress that any country should perform
approximately six flight tests for a minimally reliable missile, 50 percent or
less, then development and deployment take about five years. In case that
country wants a high reliability weapon, 75 percent or better, it would
require at least 12 test flights and at least eight years to develop and deploy.
Some sources indicate that after three tests, Iran deployed its Shahab-3
missiles. Thus, Iran must have accepted minimum performance
characteristics.
After reliability, guidance is also an important problem. Iran can
overcome this issue if it accepts minimal accuracy specifications. Today,
reliable ballistic missiles use inertial navigation systems (INS); however,
they are not compulsory elements. Simple gyro systems can be adapted and
used in conjunction with radio-command guidance, hence the missile
without INS can be fired to intermediate ranges with a sufficient accuracy to
deliver a nuclear warhead, but signals of the system are highly vulnerable to
jamming.
Besides guidance, weaponized warhead problems are much
difficult to overcome. Iran's nuclear program remains behind ballistic
missile program and does not appear to be accelerating to match. Most
experts in the area feel that Iran will pursue its nuclear weapons program
more aggressively, but there are still too many pitfalls. Unless Iran's nuclear
program receives massive foreign assistance, including direct import of
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fissile material, it will rely on conventional munitions or chemical and
biological warheads. With a non-nuclear warhead, ballistic missiles will not
be a cost-effective weapon. Once Iran obtains fissile material, it will face
difficulties in developing the capability to load nuclear device into a bomb
or a warhead will work safely, effectively, and reliably. Safety is a major
issue. The technology to ensure safety and arming of a warhead is very
complex. The risk of nuclear accidents or the danger of misfires on friendly
territory is highly likely.
Another problem Iran deals with is re-entry vehicles. The main idea
of Iran's ballistic missile program before an indigenous production
capability is the method of derivating foreign missiles. It also tries to
increase their ranges and payload capabilities. Greater ranges require
different re-entry systems, involving higher re-entry speeds, heating and
instability systems, which Iran is not able to produce.
In case of intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Iran
faces huge technical barriers. Developing them requires far more levels of
foreign support and completely new technologies. Iran has to master much
higher performance specifications and entirely foreign engineering problems
of engine clustering, multiple staging and system engineering. It should
assemble INS and nuclear destructive warhead. As Iran develops longer-
range systems, the necessity of more sophisticated warheads grows. It is
impossible to use a short-range ballistic missile warhead for an ICBM
missile. For these reasons, it is unlikely to overcome these problems without
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considerable foreign aid.
The problems stated above can be solved with the help of its
supplier countries; however, the most difficult barriers focusing Iran's
ballistic missile program may have nothing to do with technique or
hardware. They are in realm of human-related issues such as decision-
making, management expertise, engineering skills and finance.
Poor desiconmaking has been particularly significant. Iran couldn't
overcome organizational difficulties and establish clear priorities. Resources
are divided between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the
Army, and the Ministry of Defense. They cannot be concentrated on a
maximum effect. There are still roughly a dozen missile projects under way
at the same time. It is obvious that MTCR is not the only enemy of the Iran's
program; rather each missile is the worst enemy of the other.
In addition to the decision-making structure problems, Iran
currently lacks enough skilled technicians and scientists to manufacture
missiles. Shortfalls of the trained and skilled personnel limit Iran's ability to
adapt transferred technology, dual-use items, design, and production
material from abroad as well as to produce complete missile bodies, engines
and key components, particularly guidance systems.  Design may be
purchased from abroad, but development, system integration and production
are extremely difficult. They need expertise, which Iran lacks. Iran tries to
overcome this problem with institutional cooperation with Russian, Chinese
and North Koran education centers. Two Russian education centers are
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heavily involved in such a relation: The Bauman National Technical
University in Moscow and The Baltic State Technical University in St.
Petersberg. Additionally, bringing Russian missile experts to Iran may be a
solution. It is feasible for Iran to subcontract specific tasks to Russian firms
for assistance. Iran has enlisted the services of the Russian Central
Aerohyrodynamic Institute for missile design and development support.188
North Korea has also been a source for human assistance. It has supported
Iran's ballistic missile projects and established much of its Scud
infrastructure, together with China.189
Lastly, sanctions have an important impact on Iran's missile
programs. Iran's economy is a shambles, due to several years when
relatively low oil prices prevailed, rapid population growth, the lingering
costs of its war with Iraq, government mismanagement and corruption, and
a large short-term debt. Therefore, the cost of the missile program was a
serious problem in the past and seems to remain for years. Iran should
devote significant resources to its ballistic missile programs. Its military
expenditures fell from significantly due to its economic weakness. Its
budget is unlikely to permit allocation for big deals. On the other hand,
despite its financial limitations, Iran is eager to keep going developing its
ballistic missile programs.190
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CHAPTER 3.  IMPACT  OF  IRANIAN
NUCLEAR  WEAPONS
It seems clear that Iran is still continuing to search for obtaining
nuclear weapons. Among the other proliferators, Iran is considered a leading
candidate country for acquiring these lethal weapons. Most observers agree
that Iran is a proliferator and have no doubt about its nuclear weapons
programs. The issue is how far advanced its efforts are, and what the
implications are. They wonder whether Iran can have a nuclear weapon by
the end of the 2010. Few are uncertain that Iran's current level of research
can give it an atomic bomb within the next 10-15 years. Some others
consider Iran's acquisition will be sooner than everyone might anticipate.
They focus on assessing the impacts of Iranian nuclear missiles on the
regional and international peace and stability. Analysts point out that
military potential of nuclear weapons hasn't been transformed into political
influence in the past fifty years. Therefore, how Iran would employ its
nuclear weapons is not clear.  It is difficult to say how the nuclear weapon
capability would affect Iran's stature. So international community tries to
predict and assess the impact of Iran's nuclear weapons development
program.
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3.1.  Impact on Iran
An era of factional politics has begun in the political spectrum of
Iran where a power struggle between conservatives and moderates is
apparent. The emerging factions and civil groups are broadly divided into
two major groups, the moderates or liberals and the conservatives, which
will set the future direction for Iranian society and polity. The emergence of
various factions will directly and indirectly threaten the clerical rule. The
sharply divided and polarized society is heading towards lessening the
influence of the clerical establishment. Whenever the conservatives feel that
their power is at stake, they use institutions to curb and stifle opposition.
This factional politics in Iran is the product of modernization and
globalization. The liberalization of the economy during the Rafsanjani
administration contributed much more to the emergence of various social
groups and factions because it has produced a new middle class and lower
middle class in society who enjoy the benefits of economic liberalization.
These new classes desire a more open political system where they can
participate in politics and enter the power structure. The privatization,
democratization, constitutional republicanism, and economic liberalization
are the basis of the enlargement of the middle class. Both factions are
opposed to each other at ideological, social, and political levels; and
factionalism will further accentuate to create complexities in the political
system.
The effect of economic liberalization in Iran is very deep because it
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has opened the gates of demand of participation in politics. The process of
economic liberalization affected the political system of Iran as perceived
today where the two main political organizations, led by the conservatives
and the moderates or liberals are fighting fiercely to gain a hold over Iranian
politics. The power struggle between these two main political organizations
has contributed in lessening clerical influence. The conservatives are
idealists and are pursuing their policies to maintain status quo so that power
does not slip from their hands, but the liberals who are pragmatists, seek to
accommodate broader national interest with international accountability. If
the factions convert into parties and the people are involved in getting open
membership and present an alternative path to power, it will threaten the
clerical grip on power.
But Iran is still controlled by a massive network of Shi'ite clergy
who are disciples of Khomeini. They are inter-related at various levels. So,
these clerics are not about to easily abandon their grip on power. Iran's
Islamic constitution provides the conservatives ultimate control over policy
and courts. The conciliatory tone and inward looking gesture of Khatami
has shown that he wants to avoid direct confrontation with the conservative
establishment. He has taken cautious steps in challenging the clerical power.
The power struggle between these two political forces will set the future
direction of Iranian politics.191
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3.1.a.  On Domestic Politics
It is very difficult to predict in advance what impact the nuclear
weapons development program will have on Iranian policy owing to the
power struggle between factions in the domestic arena. The government in
Iran is divided between conservative hard-liners and moderate reformist
politicians. Hard-line conservatives are highly effective in key decision-
making structures of the state. Their main source of strength lies in their
control over the most powerful branches of the state apparatus. The supreme
religious leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has ultimate authority over the armed
forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps192, the judiciary, the
intelligence agencies, and the police,193 which all support Iran's nuclear
weapons program.
Although the nuclear discussions are still limited in Iran, there are
signs that serious debate is being given to the nuclear issue in the public
realm, as in the Iranian press. Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests sparked
argument over whether Iran was too far behind the arms race in the region.
Many Iranians, motivated that Iran should resume its historic leading role,
began to discuss the implications of the neighboring nuclear tests and policy
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options Iran must consider. With the South Asian testing, pro-nuclear voices
began to become louder than before. This in turn has created anti-nuclear
voices that developed a more elaborate argument although the pro-nuclear
debates have more effect on state politics. In the pro-nuclear argument, the
issue has been political.
The proponents support the realist understanding of international
politics. They focus on the specific function of the nuclear weapons and the
position of Iran in the international and regional systems. Regarding the
former, the proponents argue that the utility of nuclear weapons is lying as a
deterrent and equalizer. They see that these weapons give power in
bargaining in international negotiations and advancement of the Iran's
national interests as well as deterrence against the country's adversaries.
This idea is encouraged by the foreign threats to attack Iran's nuclear
facilities that according to proponents of nukes further justify a stronger
emphasis on deterrence in Iranian military doctrine.194 As the issue of Iran's
international and regional position, the proponents believe that Tehran's
regional leadership may only be possible by the deployment of nuclear
weapons. According to them, for playing an important role, Iran has no
other option but to acquire nuclear weapons. Deployment of them will
endow Iran a kind of social mobility by giving prestige and security.195
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In the anti-nuclear argument, the debate has been multi-
dimensional: political, economic, and technological. Part of the political
argument can also be a pragmatic reaction based on Iran's predicament. In
this argument, it is stressed that the outside world is carefully observing and
publicizing every suspected move of Iran. In such a situation, the pursuit of
a nuclear weapons program, which has to be clandestine, is too dangerous.
In this type of argument, the likelihood of an overt nuclear weapons
program, after Iran's withdrawal from NPT, is not even considered simply
because it is too dangerous to entertain. It is emphasized that any attempt to
violate its international obligations will be interpreted as an aggressive act
with dire consequences for Iran, including further sanctions and punitive
actions like military operations.
Additionally, in this argument, there are also questions regarding
the strategic utility of nuclear weapons, such that these weapons cannot
enhance Iran's security and cannot solve any problems for Iran. They will
further add new problems. The economic argument is also shaped by Iran's
predicament since it desires to improve its economy with the assistance of
outside resources. It is argued that to manufacture atomic weapons require
huge foreign investments of material resources. A clandestine nuclear
industry can only swallow resources from the economy without positive
effects to defense industries.
The technological argument is based on the inefficiency of Iran in
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this realm. For many observers, the state of Iran's scientific and
technological capabilities is itself an impediment against the pursuit of a
nuclear option. In such a situation, a nuclear weapons program is perceived
as having neither utility nor feasibility.196
3.1.b.  On Foreign Policy
The conservatives object to a foreign policy based on a position of
weakness and do not want a foreign policy that is excessively concerned
about improvement of Iran's image outside the country. They don't care too
much about Iran's relationship with the non-Muslim world, and most oppose
better ties with the West, particularly with the US. According to them,
foreign policy should be less about public relations and more about
bargaining power. They defend the clash of civilizations, not the dialogue.
As nuclear proponents, they see atomic weapon as a deterrence
force and bargaining power. They view this utility as precisely the value of
nuclear weapons. If hardliner conservative clerics come to power, Iran may
pursue a more activist, aggressive and revisionist foreign policy with a
powerful tool and confidence nuclear weapons provided them. This tool and
confidence may encourage the conservatives to give more support to
subversion and terrorism through radical Islamic revolutionary movements
and organizations in the Muslim world.
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So long as the conservatives control the key instruments of power
in Iran and continue to believe they will be the losers if a more open society
with closer ties to the United States emerges, they will use whatever
methods are necessary to put off the day when the "Great Satan" returns to
Tehran. They may sponsor terrorist activities, including the use of WMD,
against Israeli or US interests overseas. This may result in serious crises
with another nuclear weapons state. Under current circumstances, it is
possible that conservatives, rivals of moderate Khatami, might attack US
personnel and interests or Jewish land in order to embarrass and discredit
him and perhaps to prompt US or Israeli retaliation, in the hope that this
might halt efforts toward greater openness in Iran.197
The defeat of conservatives in the May 1997 presidential,
February-May 2000 Majlis and once more in June 2001 presidential
elections showed an important change in the political culture of Iran. The
change in domestic politics also affects the foreign policy. Khatami's détente
policy has been hailed by the entire world and particularly the GCC states.
This policy is intended to generate confidence among the Gulf States that
Iran poses no threat them politically and militarily.198 However, Iran’s
growing military power, especially WMD and long-range missile capability,
is perceived by the Gulf states as a threat and its efforts to build trustworthy
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relationship with them is conceived as a strategy to assert its role as a
regional power.
The GCC considers Iran's growing capabilities as a sign of growing
its hegemony in the region and as a regional security threat.199 According to
the Gulf states, Iran is still a politico-ideological threat because both
moderate reformers and hard-line conservatives are committed to pursuing
nationalistic policies in the region and rigid, ideological policies toward the
Arab-Israeli conflict as well as it supports Shi'ite minorities who reside in
various Gulf states. Iran's claim on the islands is also seen as a serious
regional security threat. In addition, Iran's opposition to the US presence in
the Gulf is perceived as a security threat since US is considered as an
assurance of regional peace and security.200
Although Iran is unable to benefit from the military potential
represented by nuclear weapons and it is unlikely to use its nuclear option,
the strategic impact lies not only the use or threat of use of the nuclear
weapons, but the political leverage derived from their possession. Therefore,
Tehran may use its weapons as a means of exerting political influence. The
ability to threaten its neighbors with nuclear weapons will enhance the
capability to press them into cooperation or coercion.
If the moderate reformist faction continues to hold the power, Iran
may continue pragmatism in the foreign policy arena. The reformers may
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persist to adhere to WMD conventions. The aspect of their discussion has
not centered on whether or not to give up WMD option but the implications
of Iran's international obligations for its interests. They fear the potential
impact of a violation on the country's ties with the outside world, especially
with the West. The moderate reformers may be less inclined to adventurism
and less likely to rely on terrorism and subversion to achieve their goals
than are conservatives.201 However, it is impossible to expect an end to
tensions due to reformists' nationalist policy in the region and ideological
approach towards Israel and the US. Besides, many scientists believe that
Iran shows no signs of any moderation. Since its missiles and non-
conventional programs are under the control of religious leader and IRGC,
which have influence on foreign policy, Iran is not inclined to follow a
sufficiently moderate foreign policy.202
3.2.  Impact on the Region
Iran's strategic interests are relatively very wide as a result of its
geopolitical location, its aim to perform regional hegemony and its
ideological characteristic of state policy. It has vital interests in the Gulf
region and has involved other parts of the Muslim world, supporting the
radical Islamic movements. Iran also an important interest in the Arab-
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Israeli conflict. It has sought to block peace process and attempted to
transform the issue into an Islamic-Israeli conflict. Besides, many
significant interests have emerged with the breakup of the Soviet Union
beyond its northern border.
In spite of these interests, Iran has many neighbors that are unstable
and have mutually bad relations. It must deal with unrest and civil strife in
its neighboring states due to its strong cultural and geographical ties.  Their
crises or instabilities might spill over into Iran or drag Tehran into their
affairs. Therefore the regional problems facing Iran are serious and all of
these problems have important military dimensions. They are likely to
encourage the further proliferation in Iran's geography, particularly non-
conventional and their delivery systems. With the developments in WMD
and missiles due to their increased range and accuracy, inter-regional
linkages between theaters of conflict become more apparent. Hence Iran
will extend its strategic reach far beyond its immediate neighborhood with
its nuclear missiles when deployed in its land.
3.2.a.  On the Middle East
Due to its wide scope of strategic interests, the Persian Gulf is the
most important area for Iran. The Gulf is Iran's focus of political activity for
several reasons: First the area is proximate to Iran's oil facilities and has
vital importance for the export of Iranian oil and goods. Second, Iran's main
rival in the arena, Iraq, has also significant considerations and interests,
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which affect Iran directly. Third, there is a Saudi challenge to Iran's Islamic
leadership. Fourth, Gulf States are all weak militarily. Fifth, the US has
political-economic influence and important interests in the Gulf region that
conflict with Iran's. Finally there is an existence of Shi'ite communities that
Iran may support this population to achieve its interests.
The Arab states of the Persian Gulf are small and vulnerable. They
feel threatened by Iran's revolutionary messages, regional ambitions and
nuclear and missile programs which increased their sense of insecurity.
Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons will change the regional balance of
power and its nuclear missiles will enable Iran dominate the region to some
extent. This might therefore alter the decision calculus of Iran's clerical
leadership. Thus, pragmatism may not be a valid guide in Iranian behavior.
By having these weapons and threatening to use them, Iran may use them to
gain leverage over the states in the Middle East. It may employ its missiles
and nuclear weapons to intimidate and force to accept Iran's leadership and
to separate their ties with the US. Actually, Iranian nuclear weapons will
make US existence more concrete in the region since these weapons force
states to find shelter under the US umbrella.
On the other hand, Iran's nuclear weapons, even small in numbers,
may complicate US power projection in the Gulf area and may raise the
potential risks and costs of US intervention. Iranian nuclear weapons would
enhance its military options. Tehran is unlikely to employ those weapons
directly. But the weapons would have an impact on US conventional options
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in a limited war. Some analysts credibly make the point that the US calculus
during the 1990-91 Kuwait invasion would have been different if Saddam
had had nuclear weapons. As a result, Iranian nuclear proliferation will
make difference to US regional commitments, forcing the US to reevaluate
its interests and to set priorities for only the most important. This would be
an undesirable development for the US and its allies in the Persian Gulf.203
Iranian leadership is trying to assert military superiority over GCC
states. Acquisition of nuclear weapons will facilitate such assertions. These
weapons also enable Tehran to transform regional superpower and gain
leverage over the US to bargain for political and economic interests as in the
North Korean example.204 In addition, Iran may use the political power of
the nuclear weapons to blackmail GCC into increasing oil quotas and
participating foreign investment in Iran.
Iran's ballistic missile capabilities will provide it with a force of
considerable strategic value. It can target cities throughout the Gulf, which
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could intimidate the GCC countries, especially if the missiles were armed
with non-conventional warheads. By its geographic position, Iran follow
everything that happens in the Persian Gulf closely, through whose waters
move one-sixth of the world's oil. Iran's naval forces have three Russian-
supplied submarines, having capability to mount ballistic missiles on, as
well as modern mines.205
Iran may also think deterring of the other nuclear weapon
possessors. For Iranians, it is unimportant if there are disparities between
Iran and the other nuclear weapon states. As noted earlier, Third World
countries' conventional forces suffer from significant weaknesses and are
prevented from accessing modern war-fighting capability by lack of
financial resources. Although nuclear weapons are not flexible or cannot
substitute for conventional weapons, they see nuclear weapons as a
compensation of their armed forces' inefficiency and as deterrence against
nuclear or non-nuclear enemies. But in a conventional conflict this thought
is highly riskier, especially both conflicting sides have nuclear weapons.
Conventional clashes risk escalation into full-scale conflict when the loosing
side seeks to recapture the initiative. Besides early use of nuclear weapons
against a threat may transform any incident into full-scale war. As a result,
the further proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the
risk of nuclear war. On the other hand, the US or Israel may execute a
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"conventional counterforce"206 or a preventive military action against
Iranian nuclear programs.
3.2.b.  On Turkey
Iran and Turkey share the similar geopolitical situation. The region
they inhabit is a gateway for both Europe and Asia. Therefore they have
many common interests207, particularly regarding Iraq,208 Central Asia and
in the field of economic cooperation. However, they are separated by
ideology and regime interests. Thus, each regime represents a threat to the
other and the secular-religious divide impacts their relationship in many
areas. Both regimes stand in complete opposition to one another on
ideological issues, alliance relationship and modes of international
behavior.209 Turkey's membership in NATO, strong ties with the US, and
cooperation with Israel raise the most difficulties for Iran.
On the other hand, Ankara has had an uneasy relationship with Iran
since the Islamic revolution. Iran's scope of interests, and its efforts to
export revolution, led Iran's regime to intervene in other states, especially
                                                
206 "Conventional Counterforce" is an attack against proliferants' nuclear
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where there seemed to be an opportunity to encourage radical Islamic
terrorism. Hence, Iran supported radical Islamic subversion in Turkey and
made efforts to export its revolution. Tehran not only supported radical
Islamic fundamentalists but also backed Marxist terrorist and separatist
PKK organization which caused to the death of thirty thousand Turkish
citizens.
Moreover, the armament effort of Iran, especially its WMD
acquisition and long-range ballistic missiles, is a cause of concern for
Turkey. Its missiles allow Iran to strike a wide variety of key economic and
military targets as well as population centers in Turkey. Therefore, Turkey
expresses its concerns over Iran's developing missile capability. Recently,
Turkey stated that Iran's trial of Fateh missile on May 31, 2001 has created
concern and made a written statement on June 1, 2001. Turkish Foreign
Ministry Spokesman said, "our country pursues a sensitive policy in
prevention of spreading of mass destructive weapons and their delivery
vehicles. In that respect we consider the efforts of certain neighboring
countries to be armed as worrying. Iran's trial of Fateh Missile on 31 May
2001 has created sensitivity in our country. We conveyed our concerns to
Iran about the issue and the developments are closely monitored."210 For the
reason of this concern, Turkey, unlike some other US allies, has seemingly
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sympathetic stance with regard to the US missile shield,211 in which the US
wants to deploy interceptor missiles in Eastern Turkey. In return for
deploying these interceptor missiles, the US is expected to provide Turkey
with defense systems such as Patriot and Arrow anti-ballistic missiles to
protect critical facilities and population centers from Iraqi, Syrian, Libyan as
well as Iranian ballistic missiles.212
Additionally, Turkey shares same concerns with Israel which is
also exposed to missile threat in the region. Israel has given sufficient
importance on missile defense. Its missile defense system is based on the
US-supplied Patriots and its indigenous interceptors, which are Arrow anti-
tactical ballistic missile systems, co-produced with the US.213 Also, Turkey
and Israel want to make cooperation in the program of developing Arrow 2
missiles after having the consent of the US. Both Israel and Turkey can
agree on the transfer of technology to Turkey to produce anti-ballistic
missile systems against neighboring missile threats.
It is clear that Turkey needs a deterrent against the WMD of
neighboring states. Some may think that Turkey may no longer think
NATO's weakened nuclear shield since during the last decade there has been
a sharp decline in the scope and quantity of NATO's nuclear capability. For
this reason, they claim that Turkey should develop its autonomous nuclear
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force because WMD threats become more numerous and
credible214although Turkey doesn't need for a nuclear deterrence, since with
its powerful and experienced Land and Air Force, Turkish Army is the
strongest one in the Middle East. In addition, arms control fora fears that
Turkey may acquire nuclear weapons by realizing what Pakistan did,
modifying the peaceful technology to gain the capability to build a nuclear
weapon.215 Some news in Turkish media, irresponsible statements of some
Turkish officials,216 close relations with Pakistan,217 Israel and Muslim
republics of the former Soviet Union, Indian and Greek supported
propaganda,218and Turkish procurements efforts with certain firms219 have
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contributed such rumors. Also, such thoughts became hurdles for Turkey's
peaceful nuclear power quest.220   
3. 3.  Impact on Non-Proliferation Regimes
In the post-Cold War Middle East, many nations have inclined to
turn toward doctrines of greater self-reliance in security. The 1991 Gulf War
may have deepened regional security concerns that resulted an increase in
regional defense budgets and arms purchases. The region has seen arms
races before, but what is new and disturbing is the escalatory danger of
WMD acquisition. States have begun to rely on themselves and are likely to
regard WMD acquisition as an urgent priority. Political and defense elites
have begun to see WMD as uniquely suited to facing emerging security
needs caused by aggressive states.
The Middle East has the greatest rate of proliferation in the world
when compared to other regions which are trying to reduce the levels of
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conventional arms and establish regional non-proliferation regimes.221  In
contrast, the Middle Eastern states are working with the most active efforts
to acquire WMD and their delivery systems. WMD acquisition in the
Middle East has been encouraged by many factors, such as the search for
deterrence and for affordable alternatives to conventional arms; the
increased availability of nuclear technology, fissile material, WMD
infrastructure, and delivery systems; the example of regional NPT
signatories (particularly Iraq and North Korea) developing covert nuclear
programs without incurring sanctions, at least initially; the political impact
of chemical weapons use during the Iran-Iraq war; the probable growth of
the Israeli nuclear stockpile and the modernization of its delivery capability;
fears of the emergence of another rogue regime that could threaten moderate
governments; insecurities generated by the seemingly permanent state of
hostility among Iran, Iraq, and the GCC states; doubts about the willingness-
-and, given US force structure cuts, the ability--of the US to intervene again
in the region on a massive scale; the attraction of WMD for radical regimes
seeking instruments of revolution; and, a desire by regional states to
increase their political-military clout, gain international prestige, divide
coalitions, or intimidate neighbors.
International analysts view that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear
tests encouraged WMD proliferation in the region. It seems clear that Iran's
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nuclear weapons will accelerate non-conventional proliferation more rapidly
than these two states' nuclear weapons. Therefore, an Iranian nuclear break-
out could have dire consequences for the NPT, undermining international
non-proliferation norms and raising questions about the future of nuclear
arms control, and perhaps prompting other regional states to re-evaluate
their WMD options. The lack of any significant adverse long-term
consequences for India and Pakistan as a result of their remaining outside
the NPT and developing and testing nuclear weapons might encourage some
states in the Middle East as well as Iran to advocate withdrawing from the
NPT as the best way to avoid an international backlash for going nuclear.
On the other hand, a few analysts thought that international export
control policies, particularly US policies, toward Iran undermine the
nonproliferation control regime. Such policies undermine Article IV of the
NPT, in which member states in good standing are allowed to access to
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes since states are innocent until
proven guilty within the NPT. Furthermore IAEA inspections and
safeguards have found Iran innocent. International community considers the
NPT to be the centerpiece of the nonproliferation regime, while at the same
time depicting that the treaty is unsuccessful in preventing nuclear
proliferation.
Iran's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles will stimulate further
WMD proliferation efforts by the Middle Eastern states, increasing tension
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in the region. Iran's missiles have already encouraged these states to
purchase weapons with a comparable retaliatory capability. They have
stimulated arms race for acquiring ballistic missiles and theater anti-ballistic
missile defense systems, like Patriot, Arrow and their successors.
In the Middle East, missiles have already been employed in several
conflicts, notably by both parties during the Iran-Iraq war, by Iraq during
the 1991 Gulf War, and during the Yemen civil war.222 Ballistic missiles are
the platforms of choice for WMD weapons, as they can carry nuclear,
biological, or chemical payloads with minor modification to the missile's
configuration. Longer-range ballistic missiles, like the Chinese CSS 2
purchased by Saudi Arabia, are likely to prove most attractive. India,
Pakistan, and Israel already have longer-range systems under development.
But even shorter-range and generally less-sophisticated missiles such as
Soviet-built Scuds are valued as deterrents in the Middle East because
distances between urban centers are relatively short. Missiles such as Scuds
can also be effective weapons of terror against an opponent who lacks a
retaliatory capability or is politically constrained. Iraq's use of Scuds against
Israel during the Gulf War is an example.
The lack of precision guidance on most of the earlier generation of
weapons that comprise the bulk of current Middle Eastern missile
inventories makes these missiles relatively ineffective for use against
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dispersed targets, such as military units. However, they are effective against
concentrated targets, such as air bases, port facilities, above-ground
command-control facilities, and headquarters.
The acquisition of ballistic missiles by a number of Middle Eastern
states attests to the diffusion of low as well as high technology weapons
throughout the region. The regional arms race casts doubt on the efficacy of
supply-based strategies of denial pursued by the Western industrialized
powers. Indeed, some Western countries continue to supply dual use
technologies to the Middle East, while ballistic missiles are sold by Russia,
China, and North Korea.
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CONCLUSION
Due to the volatile region of the world in which Iran is located,
Iranian leaders perceive reasons that support the development of nuclear
weapons. One reason is based on the Iranian belief that it is an important
actor in the international arena. Also, Iran wants to increase its influence in
the Middle East and nuclear weapons program is seen as the means to
achieve this purpose. Furthermore, Iran believes that it has been treated
unfairly and has been the subject of discrimination by the West. For these
reasons, Iran has chosen to develop nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that
revelation of a nuclear weapons program would result in political and
economic disaster, Iran has initiated a program because of its national
psychology.
Additionally, security reasons exist to support Iran's consideration
of developing of a nuclear weapons program. Iran learned from its war with
Iraq that it could only rely on itself for its security, not the international
community. Even though Iraq invaded Iran, the United States and the
international community generally supported Iraq, a country that used
chemical weapons against Iranian cities and civilians. Despite Iraq's defeat
in the Gulf War, it continues to be Iran's greatest potential foe. Should Iraq
secretly rebuild its nuclear weapons program despite the UN Resolutions, it
would directly threaten Iran. Iranians think that they cannot afford to be
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caught unprepared and must be capable of deterring potential Iraqi
aggression.
Iran’s inclination to consider a nuclear weapons option has been
present since the 1960s when the Shah's pro-American regime had great
expectations for Iran’s role in the region and the world. However, it was the
bloody war with Iraq from 1980-1988, including Iraq’s use of chemical
weapons and Iran’s sense of isolation from the world community that gave
rise to the most intense discussions within the following regimes as to the
merits of a nuclear capability. The nuclear tests conducted in May 1998 by
India and Pakistan, North Korean issue in 1995, the US power projection
capability in the region, and the existence of Israel’s nuclear capability and
long-range missiles have reinforced the pro-nuclear debates. Iranians began
to consider nuclear weapons to be an essential requirement for national
defense and bargaining power with powerful states. In addition, the
restrained international, particularly US, response to the Pakistani and
Indian conduct of nuclear tests was presumably noted by the Iranians and it
has provided further acceleration for Iran to attempt to achieve the status it
needs to negotiate from a position of strength to nuclear legitimacy.
Currently, Iran has two policies on nuclear weapons program: a
declared policy advocating global abolition of such weapons and a secret
policy to build and sustain nuclear weapons capability. It has been claimed
that, Iran acceded to nonproliferation regimes with the intention to cheat.
This not surprising in light of behavior of Iraqi and North Korean
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experiences with respect to NPT violations. These countries have
demonstrated that accession to nonproliferation regimes does not preclude
the development of nuclear weaponry. In contrast, it provides respectability,
thereby facilitating access to the materials and technologies needed to
develop such weapons. Moreover, by adopting a secret nuclear weapons
policy, Iran hopes to deter future unconventional or conventional attacks
against Iranian land by developing the means to threaten retaliation in kind.
This policy provides Iran with the opportunity for the possession of
capability in time of crisis without having to pay a price for possession of
the capability in non-crisis periods.
For political reasons, Iranian leadership may decide that Iran might
adopt an ambiguous stature concerning its nuclear options, neither
confirmed nor denied, equivalent to Israel's opaque nuclear weapons policy.
To accomplish its aims, Iran might remain silent about its nuclear
capabilities and follow an ambiguous nuclear posture. Otherwise,
international community may impose intensive sanctions and interventions,
particularly by the US and Israel.
In order to decide whether to develop nuclear weapons, Iran should
initially have determined the costs and benefits of doing so. The largest
drawback is that a nuclear weapons program would violate Iran's status as a
non-nuclear weapons state under the NPT and its safeguards agreement with
the IAEA. The international community, through UN resolutions and with
strong urging from the United States, would most likely impose
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international economic sanctions on Iran like those currently in place on
Iraq. In addition, Iran would be forced to dismantle its nuclear weapons
program, which would have cost so much to produce. A clandestine nuclear
weapons program would destroy Iran's political and economic relations with
other states, thereby completely isolating Iran in the international system
and ruining an economy already struggling to recover from its long war with
Iraq. Iran has already seen what has happened to Iraq due to the revelation
of its nuclear weapons program, which could be a strong deterrent for Iran.
At this point in time, Iran cannot afford such harsh and stringent
punishment.
In contrast what Iranians consider, nuclear weapons could not be
used to enhance Iran's international or regional prestige because the
existence of such weapons would have to remain completely secret in order
to avoid the punishments. Evidence or even strong suspicions based on
Iranian actions and statements could elicit IAEA inspections, which could
expose the nuclear weapons program. Iran would have to publicly deny the
existence of a nuclear weapons program. Withdrawing from the NPT under
Article X is also not a feasible choice because the decision to do so would
be viewed as confirmation of international suspicions regarding Iran's
nuclear motives and would most likely create a negative international
response that would ultimately harm Iran's economy. Also, a nuclear
weapons stockpile would definitely make Iran a target of the nuclear
weapons states' nuclear missiles, which would not be in Iran's best security
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interests.
Economic reasons also exist that prohibit Iran from developing a
nuclear weapons program. A nuclear weapons program would be extremely
costly, especially when Iran is trying to rebuild after its eight-year war with
Iraq. Since the end of its war with Iraq, Iran has been rebuilding its basic
infrastructure and its military by borrowing large sums of money.
Furthermore, Iran's economic strength has been exhausted by high inflation,
unemployment, a rapidly growing population and corruption. Thus, Iran
may not have the economic capacity to support a clandestine nuclear
weapons program in its current economic crises. Economists point to the
fragile state of the Iranian economy and question whether sufficient
resources can be committed to a nuclear program.
On the other hand, given a tight resource constraint, Iran might find
the pursuit of nuclear weapons to be an attractive alternative to a higher cost
acquisition of large numbers of modern conventional weapons. Indeed, the
acquisition of an indigenous nuclear capability is not likely to bring long-
term savings over reliance on sophisticated conventional arms, since
building and sustaining the necessary infrastructure and maintenance of the
facilities and materials are very expensive. Therefore, it seems doubtful that
Iran could afford the opportunity cost of spending billions of dollars on
weapons that, if discovered, would only further harm its economy due to
further international sanctions and embargoes.
The only policy option available to Iran will provide an affluent
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and peaceful future is a policy of denuclearization. A nuclear program
would only have interfered with Iran’s hard road ahead in building a
sustainable energy future, healing its economy, democratizing its political
system, and improving its human rights record. Iran should alter its nuclear
weapons and missile programs with an economic development program.
Economic considerations should also override ideological objectives.
Adoption of this policy will reduce the reliance of the Middle East states on
Western forces, decrease the tendency within GCC governments to
modernize their military hence decreasing tensions and arms proliferation,
increase the willingness of international investors to join with Iranian
entrepreneurs in joint ventures.
Iran should be sincere with its economic policy. If it is, particularly
with nuclear program that it is peaceful, Tehran should eliminate
international skepticism and concerns about its program. One way Iran
could reduce suspicions about its nuclear weapons program would be to
agree to new protocols that the IAEA has come up with for inspecting
nuclear facilities, the 93+2 program, which is made into a document called
Additional Protocol (Information Circular-INFCIRC/540). Without
compliance with the Additional Protocol, the IAEA inspections of Iran's
existing facilities are not taken seriously by Western community. But
Iranians say they won't do this unless they are given access to civilian
nuclear technology, which the US and arms control fora will refuse to go
along with.
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Iranian leaders in Tehran, particularly Khatami and his team, are
aware that the regime's fading political fortunes cannot be reversed with
exaggerated talks of external threat rhetoric and only pragmatically inspired
policy directed at rational economic development at home and constructive
dialogue abroad can improve country's future. President Khatami is likely to
adopt a gradual and incremental approach in both domestic and foreign
policy. His policy is expected to strengthen a more liberal approach towards
freedom and democratization. If movement in the direction of these goals
were to become apparent, Iran's foreign policy would be more moderate and
less aggressive. A conservative regime, antagonistic to the United States and
Israel, would likely to continue to be isolated and feel a greater need for a
deterrent. Thus, the risks of counter measures against the regime would be
much greater. In contrast, a more moderate and pragmatic regime that has
repaired relations with the region states as well as Washington would be
more likely to be part of regional security discussions and might be less in
need of nuclear weapons.
Improved relations with the US would facilitate Iran's integration in
the international system, making it more attractive to foreign investment. At
the same time there can be neither lasting peace nor stability in the Middle
East, Caucasus, and Central Asia unless Iran is incorporated into these
regional systems. The leaders in Washington and Tehran must come to
recognize these mutual geopolitical and economic interests. A political
rapprochement between two countries would probably provide an
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opportunity for any regime in Iran to reevaluate the benefits of exercising a
nuclear weapons option. Iran's decision on this issue would be influenced by
improvements in the regional security environment and the reduction of US
economic sanctions and Iran's inclusion in Caspian energy projects.
Because of the propensity for mutual mistrust, the US set out to
exclude Iran from regional security arrangements, to polarize the country's
secular and radical factions, to counter quickly at every step its influence in
Central Asia, to strangle its economy by orchestrating international
embargoes, to portray Iran as a rogue fanatical terrorist state bent on
wrecking the Middle East peace process, and to indicate Iran's WMD and
missile programs.
The US should pursue reasonable measures to control Iran's WMD
in the entire context of the regional peace. First, Israel must be persuaded to
sign the NPT. This would send a clear and honest massage to the Arab
nations and Iran that Israel is willing to conform to an international nuclear
standard; it may induce Iran to establish dialogue with Israel. Second, an
Agreed Framework similar to the one negotiated with the North Koreans in
1995 should be pursued with Iran in order to control the level and type of
nuclear technology. Third, The most effective way to delay or prevent an
Iranian nuclear weapons program is for the international community to
make sure that Iraq never seriously reconstitutes its nuclear or biological
programs. Unfortunately there is sufficient evidence that Saddam is still
determined to build a nuclear weapon. Therefore Iran’s concerns must be
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taken very seriously and the Iraqi threat should be reduced. The IAEA
should prevent Iraq from rebuilding its nuclear program through the
stringent implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 715.
Finally, the UN, through US leadership, should enact and enforce a
resolution calling for the complete ban of nuclear weapons within the
Middle East, namely internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zone
(NWFZ) in the Middle East.
On the other hand, the US must carefully and equitably distribute
economic and military assistance within the Middle East in order to
preclude creating a de facto regional imbalance of power. Washington
should pursue an open door strategy with Iran to establish a meaningful and
long-term peace process in the Middle East. Otherwise, the US will continue
to commit resources and lives to contain the undeterrable people.
The best way of dealing with Iranian challenge is to use a broad
array of diplomatic, political and economic tools. Should Iran become
further integrated into global economy and actively included in the
community of nations, it might voluntarily suppress some of its most
intemperate impulses and moderate some of its more problematic conduct.
Therefore, US administration should pursue a policy of engagement against
Iran which would afford the US a direct channel to the Iranian government
even if it find little agree about. Engagement offers the opportunity to
promote continued moderation in Iran, promote enough economic
development to save Iran from weakening, provide a required measures to
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its neighboring Saddam, and enhance stability in the critical Persian Gulf
region. Engagement will more effectively shape nuclear weapons
development in Iran while attempting to eliminate the commercial and
military-technical vacuum that Russia, China, North Korea and France all
eagerly seek to fill. Engaging Iran, before it obtains or develops a nuclear
weapons capability, would promote non-proliferation by eliminating WMD,
especially nuclear weapons.
A realistic view of Iran's strategic situation must temper US policy.
The ultimate goal of this approach would be a regional arms control regime,
anchored by the GCC, with a more moderate Iran as a key signatory, and
should ultimately include India, Pakistan, Israel and even Iraq. The key is
that engagement gives the US a place at the table with all parties, with more
tools available than policy relies solely on sanctions, for which the essential
reason is to deprive Iran of the necessary financial resources it needs to
sponsor terrorism and to acquire and develop WMD.
On the other hand, current containment policy risks serious military
consequences: The US has essentially pushed Iran into the arms of states
that only want to supply with weapons to satisfy both their legitimate
defense requirements and destabilizing aggressive tendencies. Another by-
product is Iran’s robust indigenous arms industry. US lack of economic and
diplomatic ties with Iran means that US would have to monitor these
developments from the outside and have no opportunity to positively
influence them. Containment attempts to marginalize the Gulf’s greatest
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potential power and carries the risk of giving Iran the pretext of being a
victim of sanctions and to walk out of the NPT. In case of this scenario,
Iran's nuclear energy efforts cannot be followed by way of inspections.
However, engagement realistically recognizes this marginalization as
impossibility and seeks instead to use Iran as a force for regional stability.
Most specialists believe that Iran is pursuing nuclear option with a
determination. It is pursuing a strategy of flexible acquisition, keeping
multiple options open. It wants to take advantage of any opportunities to
obtain required technology and materials. At the same time, it aims to
develop a nuclear infrastructure over the long term, pursuing the whole
process of understanding nuclear weapon design and production. Despite all
international efforts, it seems that Iran is not likely to give up its nuclear
program. It is on a course to acquire nuclear weapons, and will almost
certainly acquire them in near future. Although international community -
except for Iran's supplier countries - cannot stop the program, at least it can
delay. It should therefore seek to delay Tehran's efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons, while encouraging the peaceful evolution of Iranian political
system. Delaying acquisition buys time to develop countermeasures to Iran's
capabilities and to further obstruct its efforts to acquire WMD, and it also
creates opportunities to influence the domestic or regional environment in
order to mitigate the impact of proliferation. The policy should be to
establish a credible deterrence relationship with Iran and a credible
reassurance relationship with the US-led allied states in the region.
117
Concerning Iran's missile program, the only thing international
community can do is to slow down and to avert Russian and North Korean
assistance, and possibly Chinese aid at some point in the future. At the same
time, the region should enhance its defenses, especially missile defenses,
against Iranian nuclear missiles. On the political level, there is no arms
control alternative to missile defense, which is stabilizing in the Middle
East. It does not replace deterrence or civil defense but rather complements
them by providing a multiple response to the challenge of missile
proliferation. It neutralizes the Iranian missile power that has hegemonic
ambitions which threaten the regional states and Western interests in the
Gulf area.
Missile defense also reinforces deterrence by reinstating the
strength of conventional airpower against the numerically superior land
forces as well as adversaries' missiles. Any robust regional defenses that
neutralized the missile power of Middle Eastern "states of concern" would
enhance the security of countries that have relied on advanced Western air
platforms for their defense; this would include Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.
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